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Abstract 
 
This Article offers a novel doctrinal resolution of the key issues in Fisher v. Texas, the 
impending Supreme Court case which involves race conscious admissions policies at the 
University of Texas at Austin (UT).  The resolution proposed here addresses Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s concerns about race conscious policies, but also preserves most of the Court’s 2003 
Grutter v. Bollinger ruling, in spite of the fact that Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter.  
Substantively, the Article clarifies the key issues in Fisher (the meaning of “critical mass” and 
the scope of deference that courts give to universities) by focusing on a simple idea that 
permeates Grutter and Fisher but has not been analyzed in the scholarly literature to date: the 
significance of diversity within racial groups.  It argues that under Grutter, a race conscious 
policy can aim not only to increase minority representation overall, but also to increase diversity 
within racial groups.  Moreover, the Article contends that diversity within racial groups is key to 
understanding the constitutionality of race conscious admissions policies for several reasons: 1. 
Within-group diversity elucidates clearly how a “critical mass” of minority students is different 
from numerical goals and quotas; 2. Within-group diversity directly reflects the compelling 
interest in educational diversity at the classroom level that was articulated in Grutter—the 
breakdown of racial stereotypes and the facilitation of cross-racial understanding through 
admission of a “critical mass”; 3.  A holistic admissions policy that emphasizes within-group 
diversity reduces the stigmatic harm of race conscious measures; and 4. Attaining diversity 
within racial groups necessitates a degree of deference to universities in their admissions 
policies.  Nevertheless, after reviewing the basic substantive issues in Fisher, the Article also 
illustrates how the Fifth Circuit could have been less deferential to UT in its Fisher ruling.  It 
distinguishes between three different categories of deference to universities—implementation of 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087731
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race conscious policies, educational objectives related to racial diversity, and need for race 
conscious policies—and analyzes the appropriate standard of review for each.  The third 
category, need for race conscious policies, is the issue at play in Fisher, and the Article contends 
that Justice Kennedy’s view on this issue will be outcome determinative in Fisher.  The Article 
then proposes a different analysis to decide Fisher—the “unique contribution to diversity” test—
which focuses on within-group diversity and applies strict scrutiny rather than the “good faith” 
standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit. These distinctions are directly reflective of the concerns 
raised in Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent.  Finally, the Article highlights a key values conflict 
that Justice Kennedy will face when deciding Fisher: the tension the case presents between 
diversity in higher education and racial segregation in K-12 schooling. 
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Introduction  
 
I.  “Critical Mass” as a Compelling Interest: The Role of Diversity Within Racial Groups 
A.  Rejecting “Critical Mass” as a Racial Quota or Numerical Goal 
B. “Critical Mass” as a Counter to Tokenism: A Relevant but Limited View 
C.  The Grutter Majority’s Functional View of “Critical Mass”: Educational  
      Benefits of Within-Group Diversity   
 1.  Why “Critical Mass” Cannot Be Defined by Minority Student Numbers 
 2.  Why “Critical Mass” Can Vary for Different Minority Groups 
3.  Can “Critical Mass” be Measured At All? 
 
II.  Within-Group Diversity, Narrow Tailoring and Deference: Reducing Stigmatic Harm 
 A.  Overview of Stigmatic Harm 
B.  Grutter’s Theory of Narrow Tailoring 
1.  The Gratz/Grutter Distinction 
 2.  Least Restrictive Means as the “Least Stigmatic Means”  
C.  Within-Group Diversity and Grutter’s Internal Logic 
D.  Standards of Review in Grutter: The Need for Deference to Universities 
 
III.  Fisher v. Texas: “Critical Mass” and Deference to Universities 
 A.  Overview 
  1.  Hopwood v. Texas and the Top Ten Percent Law 
 2.  Post-Grutter Return of Race Conscious Admissions 
 3.  Plaintiffs’ Claim 
  4.  Fifth Circuit Ruling in Fisher  
 B.  “Critical Mass” as Applied in Fisher 
  1.  Plaintiffs’ View of “Critical Mass” 
 2.  UT and Fifth Circuit’s View of “Critical Mass” 
 3.  Judge Higginbotham’s Analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law 
C.  Deference to Universities in Fisher 
 1.  Plaintiffs’ View of Deference 
 2.  UT and Fifth Circuit’s View of Deference 
D.  Critiquing Fisher’s Approach to “Critical Mass” and Deference 
 1.  Focus on Numbers and Percentages 
 2.  Incomplete Consideration of the Educational Benefits of Diversity 
 3.  No Meaningful Standard for Judicial Review 
 4.  Problematic Analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law 
5.  The Question of Different Racial Groups  
 
IV.  Three Categories for Review: Implementation vs. Educational Objective vs. Need 
A.  Review of the Implementation of a Race Conscious Policy – Strict Scrutiny 
B.  Review of a University’s Compelling Interest in Racial Diversity – “Good Faith” 
C.  Review of the Need for Race Conscious Policy to Achieve a University’s  
      Educational Objective: The Question in Fisher 
1.  Ex ante Review with Respect to Need: “Good Faith” 
 2.  Ex post Review with Respect to Need: Strict Scrutiny 
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V.  Unique Contribution to Diversity: Applying Strict Scrutiny in Fisher 
 A.  Assessing Unique Contribution to Diversity Instead of “Critical Mass” 
 1.  Unique Contribution to Representation of Different Racial Groups 
  2.  Unique Contribution to Diversity Within Racial Groups 
  3.  What Would be the Result in Fisher? 
B.  Limiting Principle on Race Conscious Policies to Attain Diversity 
 1.  Point of Diminishing Returns for the Educational Benefits of Diversity 
2.  Aggregate Weight of Race in Admissions 
C.  Advantages of a “Unique Contribution to Diversity” Test  
1.  Ground for Judicial Review and Application of Strict Scrutiny 
2.  Assessing the Unique (Even if Minimal) Impact of Race Conscious    
     Policies 
 3.  Proper Application of Grutter’s “Sunset” Requirement 
 4.  Continued Constitutional Viability of Race Conscious Admissions Policies  
5.  Highlighting Justice Kennedy’s Values Conflict: Predicating Diversity on     
     Segregation 
 
Conclusion 
Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups  6 
 
Introduction  
 In the fall of 2012, when it hears the case of Fisher v. Texas,
1
 the U.S. Supreme Court 
will revisit one of the most contentious issues it has decided in recent decades: the 
constitutionality of race conscious admissions policies in higher education.  In 2003, a fractured 
Court upheld such policies in Grutter v. Bollinger,
2
 with a 5-4 majority opinion authored by 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.  While Grutter was clear in its approval of race conscious policies 
and educational diversity as a compelling interest, it left open some contentious questions: the  
meaning of a “critical mass” of minority students and the scope of deference given to universities 
regarding the use of race conscious policies.  These will be the key issues when the Court 
decides Fisher and determines the constitutionality of the University of Texas at Austin’s (UT) 
undergraduate admissions policy.   
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s swing vote will now likely be outcome determinative in 
Fisher.
3
  Justice Kennedy dissented from the holding in Grutter,
4
 but he did not completely 
                                                          
1
 Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (2011)(en banc denied), cert. granted (February 21, 2012)(No. 11-345), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-00345qp.pdf 
2
 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
3
 Justice Elena Kagan has recused herself from Fisher because of her role in the case, as Solicitor General, when it 
was still in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas.  Based on their prior jurisprudence, Justices 
Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, along with Chief Justice Roberts, will likely vote to overturn 
Fisher and even Grutter.  See generally Grutter at 346-87 (Scalia, J. dissenting; Thomas, J., dissenting)(expressing 
disdain for the Grutter majority’s approval of race conscious admissions policies); Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,  551 U.S. 701 (Chief Justice Robert’s majority opinion, joined by Justice 
Alito, striking down race conscious admissions policy.). Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia 
Sotomayor will likely vote to uphold the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher ruling.  See generally Grutter at 311-45 (majority 
opinion upholding race conscious admissions policy joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg); Charlie Savage, 
Videos Shed New Light on Sotomayor’s Positions, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A17, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/politics/11judge.html (noting that Justice Sotomayor “once described 
herself as ‘a product of affirmative action’ and “thought it was ‘critical that we promote diversity …’.”).  If Justice 
Kennedy votes with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, the Court would vote to a 4-4 tie and automatically 
affirm the Fifth Circuit opinion in Fisher.  Thus, Justice Kennedy’s resolution of the case will be key.  See also 
Allen Rostron, Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy, and the Virtues of the Middle Ground, 107 NW. U. L. REV 
COLLOQUY 74, 77 (2012)(noting that when the Supreme Court decides Fisher v. Texas, “Justice Kennedy’s vote 
would carry the day regardless of whether Kagan participates in the case.”). 
4
 Grutter at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  The question presented to the Supreme Court in Fisher is narrowly 
framed  to include Grutter as precedent: “Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), permit the University of Texas at 
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rebuff the use of race as an admissions factor;
5
  moreover, his race and equal protection 
jurisprudence has been evolving over time.
6
  So the overarching question in Fisher is how much, 
if at all, will Justice Kennedy curb the use of race conscious policies?
7
  And the answer to this 
question depends on Justice Kennedy’s view of the two key issues in Fisher: “critical mass” and 
deference. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Austin’s use of race in undergraduate admissions decisions.”). See http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-
00345qp.pdf.   Thus, Justice Kennedy and the Court might not reconsider Grutter itself, but just aim to clarify it. 
5
 Grutter at 392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as 
one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity …”).  Moreover, although Justice Kennedy dissented in 
Grutter, he did agree with the Grutter majority’s affirmance of Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  See Grutter at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The opinion 
by Justice Powell, in my view, states the correct rule for deciding the case … Justice Powell’s approval of the use of 
race in university admissions reflected a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a 
university’s conception of its on educational massion.”).   In Bakke, four Justices voted to strike down the University 
of California at Davis Medical School special admissions program, which set aside 16 of 100 spots in each admitted 
class for members of minority groups, and four Justice voted to uphold the admissions policy.  Justice Powell voted 
to strike down the UC-Davis program, but wrote that race could be used as a “plus factor” for achieving the 
compelling state interest of diversity in education.  Powell’s concurring opinion was cited as support for this 
proposition in Grutter.  Grutter at 307 (“[T]he Court endorses Justice Powell's view 
that student body diversity is a compelling state interest in the context of university admissions.”). 
6
 See Heather Gerkin, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 130 
(2007)(noting that “Justice Kennedy's opinions in LULAC and Parents Involved invite us to abandon our monolithic 
stories about race and think about equal protection in domain-centered terms.”).  Professor Gerkin also observes that 
in Parents Involved, “Justice Kennedy  makes a remarkably similar argument [to Justice O'Connor's argument in 
Grutter] …  even observing that public schools could use a Grutter-like admissions policy as a last resort.”).  Id. at 
117.  See also Parents Involved at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)(“ [A] 
district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of 
that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered.”). 
7
 Other commentators also note that Justice Kennedy will probably not completely preclude the use of race in 
admissions.  See, e.g.,Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of Demographic 
and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 113, 117 (2012)(noting that in Fisher, “the decisive vote of 
Justice Anthony Kennedy … likely will preclude repudiation of Grutter’s central holding.”); Lyle Denniston, 
Constitution Check: Is Affirmative Action in College Admissions Doomed?(Feburary 23, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lyle-denniston/affirmative-action_b_1294671.html, (“Looking back to what 
Kennedy wrote in dissent in 2003, he recalled with approval Justice Powell's view that a university admissions 
program ‘may take account of race as one, nonpredominant factor in a system designed to consider each applicant as 
an individual,’ …   Justice Kennedy has been somewhat more flexible on race issues than some of his conservative 
colleagues, and he may not yet be ready to cast aside altogether the use of race as ‘one, nonpredominant factor …’).  
Some commentators have also contended that Justice Kennedy will very likely narrow the scope of race conscious 
admissions in Fisher.   See Rostron, supra note 3, at 78 (contending that in Fisher, “the most likely outcome is that 
Kennedy will … refus[e] to put a complete stop to affirmative action, but insist[] … that rigorous strict scrutiny 
really and truly will apply.”); Vikram D. Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action Cases? 
Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes (April 2012). VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC, 2012 Forthcoming; UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 298. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2064995 (contending that “the most likely Fisher result is … one in which the window for 
race-based affirmative action in higher education will be narrowed, but left ever-so-slightly open.”)(footnote 
omitted). 
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 This Article offers a novel doctrinal resolution of the key issues in Fisher—a resolution 
which preserves most of the Grutter holding but also addresses the concerns in Justice 
Kennedy’s Grutter dissent.   The Article clarifies the meaning of “critical mass” and the scope of 
deference given to universities by focusing on a simple idea that permeates Grutter and Fisher 
but which has not been explicated to date: the significance of diversity within racial groups.
8
  It 
argues that a race conscious policy can aim not only to increase minority representation overall, 
but also to increase diversity within racial groups—a point which has not been analyzed in 
scholarly discourse on Grutter or Fisher.  Moreover, the Article contends that diversity within 
racial groups is key to understanding the constitutionality of race conscious admissions policies 
for several reasons: 1. Within-group diversity elucidates how “critical mass” of minority students 
is different from numerical goals and quotas; 2. Within-group diversity directly reflects the 
compelling interest in educational diversity at the classroom level that was articulated in 
Grutter—the breakdown of racial stereotypes and the facilitation of cross-racial understanding 
                                                          
8
 This Article will use the phrases “diversity within racial groups” and “within-group diversity” interchangeably. 
Both refer to the variety of viewpoints and experiences that exist among members of the same racial group.  It 
should be noted that while the implications of within-group diversity for the constitutionality of race conscious 
admissions have not considered, there has been scholarly attention to within-group diversity in admissions from a 
social justice perspective.  For example, Professors Kevin Brown and Jeanine Bell advocate for universities to 
distinguish between different Black groups, such as Black immigrants (from Africa and the Caribbean), multiracial 
persons, Black Latinos, and African Americans, when implementing their race conscious admissions policies.  See 
Kevin Brown & Jeanine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the Increasing 
Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher Educational Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1231 
(2008)(questioning admissions policies “that lump[ ] all blacks into a single-category approach that pervades 
admissions decisions of so many selective colleges, universities, and graduate programs.”).  Professors Brown and 
Bell further note that given “the growing percentage of blacks with a white parent and foreign-born black 
immigrants and their sons and daughters” at selective institutions, “blacks whose predominate racial and ethnic 
heritage is traceable to the historical oppression of blacks in the U.S. are far more underrepresented than 
administrators, admissions committees, and faculties realize.”).  Id.  See also Kevin Brown, Should Black 
Immigrants Be Favored Over Black Hispanics and Black Multiracials in the Admissions Processes of Selective 
Higher Education Programs?, 54 How. L.J. 255, 302 (2011)(arguing that “admissions committees of selective 
higher education institutions should not provide treatment that is more favorable to Black immigrant applicants … 
.”).  Professors Henry Louis Gates and Lani Guinier have raised similar concerns.  See Cara Anna, Immigrants 
among blacks at colleges raises diversity questions, BOSTON GLOBE, April 30, 2007, 
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/04/30/immigrants_among_blacks_at_colleges_raises_d
iversity_questions/?page=2  (“The issue of native vs. immigrant blacks took hold at Harvard in 2004, when 
professors Henry Louis Gates and Lani Guinier pointed out at a black alumni reunion that a majority of attendees 
were of African or Caribbean origin.”). 
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through admission of a “critical mass”; 3.  A holistic admissions policy that emphasizes within-
group diversity reduces the stigmatic harm of race conscious measures; and 4. Attaining diversity 
within racial groups necessitates a degree of deference to universities in their admissions 
policies.  Nevertheless, after reviewing the basic substantive issues in Fisher,
9
 the Article also 
illustrates how the Fifth Circuit could have been less deferential to UT in its Fisher ruling, and it 
proposes a different method for resolving the case.   
 Part I provides the background on Grutter’s holding that enrollment of a “critical mass” 
of minority students is a compelling state interest.  This Part illustrates that the chief educational 
benefits of diversity espoused in Grutter are the breakdown of racial stereotypes and the 
facilitation of cross-racial understanding—by showing White students that minority students 
from each group have a “variety of viewpoints.”10  Consequently, a “critical mass” of minority 
students refers not only to numerical representation of racial groups, but also to the diversity of 
viewpoints and experiences within each group, which contribute to the educational benefits of 
diversity articulated in Grutter.  This view of “critical mass” is different from other notions of 
the concept that focus narrowly on numbers or define it by feelings of isolation encountered by 
minority students.  Thus, this Part shows how “critical mass” is distinct from numerical goals 
and quotas, which was a one of Justice Kennedy’s key concerns in his Grutter dissent.  
Ultimately, this Part argues that “critical mass” is not a measurable entity—it is a concept which 
                                                          
9
 This Article analyzes the merits issues in Fisher; it does not address procedural challenges, including standing and 
mootness, that UT raised in its response to the Plaintiff’s cert petition.  See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, Fisher, (No. 11-345).  Available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Fisher.BIO.Final.12.7.2011.pdf.  For 
a discussion of these issues, see Amar, supra note 7, at 12-18; Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) to Bring an 
Affirmative-Action Challenge (August 2, 2012). 122 Yale Law Journal 2012 Forthcoming; Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2122956 (arguing that there are significant procedural defects in Fisher v. Texas). 
10
 Grutter at 319-20 (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose 
their force because nonminority students learn there is no  'minority viewpoint'  but rather a variety of viewpoints 
among minority students.”).   
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articulates a university’s compelling interest in diversity, not part of the narrow tailoring test for 
race conscious admissions policies.   
Part II expands upon this discussion by showing how within-group diversity and “critical 
mass” are related to Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles—thus illustrating the internal logic and 
coherence of a much maligned Grutter majority opinion.
11
  It argues that Grutter’s narrow 
tailoring principles aim to minimize the stigmatic harm
12
 of race conscious policies, by ensuring 
that members of the same racial group are given individualized consideration and not treated in 
exactly the same manner—the “least stigmatic means” theory of narrow tailoring. 13  This Part 
also argues that in addition to its educational benefits, within-group diversity helps to minimize 
stigmatic harm.  As such, within-group diversity links “critical mass” and narrow tailoring and 
highlights the internal logic and coherence of the Grutter majority opinion.  Furthermore, a race 
conscious policy can aim not only to increase representation of different racial groups, but also to 
generate diversity within racial groups.  Finally, the analysis in this Part illustrates how within-
group diversity and narrow tailoring are related to courts’ deference to universities decisions in 
determining their admissions policies.   
                                                          
11
 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Grutter and Fisher: A Reassessment and a Preview, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 57, 
64 (2012)(discussing “problems with and perverse implications of the student body diversity rationale Grutter 
adopts for justifying the use of racial preferences in the context of higher education students admissions.”); Roger 
Clegg, Attacking “Diversity”: A Review of Peter Wood's Diversity: The Invention of a Concept, 31 J.C. & U.L. 417, 
431 (2005) (claiming that “the Grutter Court relied on this rather convoluted reasoning” in its articulation of 
diversity as a compelling interest.); Fisher at 247 (Garza, J., specially concurring)(“Grutter represents a digression in 
the course of constitutional law … .”)oral  Even proponents of affirmative action have been critical of Grutter’s 
emphasis on diversity instead of racial justice.  See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1622, 1622 (2003)(“[T]he concept of diversity, far from a viable means of ensuring affirmative action in the 
admissions policies of colleges and graduate schools, is a serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial 
justice.”).   
12
 Stigmatic harm is the constitutional harm that occurs when a government policy treats individuals in the same 
manner solely because of their race.  For a more detailed discussion of stigmatic harm, see infra Part II.A. 
13
 This Article argues that reducing the stigmatic harm of race conscious admissions policies is a key facet of 
Grutter, particularly for the narrow tailoring requirements and the “critical mass” concept.  See Part II.B.  It does 
not, however, take a normative stance on whether reducing such stigmatic harm should be a major concern. 
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 Part III focuses the application of “critical mass” and deference in Fisher.  It first gives 
the background to Fisher, including the Fifth Circuit’s 1996 decision in Hopwood v. Texas,14 the 
enactment of the “race neutral”15 Top Ten Percent Law, and the reinstatement of race conscious 
admissions after Grutter.  Next, this Part considers the parties’ arguments regarding “critical 
mass” and deference, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on these issues, and Chief Judge Jones’s critique 
of this ruling in her dissent to the denial of an en banc hearing in Fisher.  It then critiques the 
application of “critical mass” in Fisher, concluding that “critical mass” and numerical goals were 
indistinguishable in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the case.  Moreover, this Part also illustrates 
how the Fisher panel’s deference to UT did not leave sufficient room for judicial review.  In the 
process, this Part underscores how “critical mass” and deference will be key points for Justice 
Kennedy when deciding Fisher. 
 Part IV addresses standard of review and deference in detail.  It lays out three categories 
of review with respect to deference to universities: 1. Review of the actual implementation of 
race conscious policies as implemented, which requires strict scrutiny; 2. Review of whether the 
university’s educational objective encompasses racial diversity (essentially, whether the 
university has a compelling interest in diversity), which requires only “good faith” on the part of 
the university; and 3. Review of whether race conscious admissions policies are needed to attain 
this educational objective, which is the core issue in Fisher and the source of controversy.  
                                                          
14
 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
15
 This Article presumes, as the Fisher litigation did, that the Top Ten Percent Law is “race neutral”—meaning that 
there is no direct and explicit consideration of race in the decision-making process.  But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)(“Calling … 10% or 20% plans ‘race-neutral’ seems to me 
disingenuous, for they ‘unquestionably were adopted with the specific purpose of increasing representation of 
African-Americans and Hispanics in the public higher education system.’”).  See also Fisher at 242n.156 (“A court 
considering the constitutionality of the [Top Ten Percent Law] would examine whether Texas enacted the Law (and 
corresponding admissions policies) because of its effects on identifiable racial groups or in spite of those effects. See 
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); cf. Brief of Social Scientists 
Glenn C. Loury et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 
2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003), available at 2003 WL 402129, at *2, *9–*10 (noting that ‘it is not clear that 
[percentage] plans are actually race-neutral’ and that some amici counsel in Grutter ‘have signaled interest in 
moving on after this case to challenge these aspects of the Texas program’).”). 
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Focusing on the third category, this Part distinguishes between ex ante deference (before a 
university applies a race neutral policy to increase diversity) and ex post deference (after a 
university applies a race neutral policy to increase diversity, as is the case in Fisher after the Top 
Ten Percent Law was implemented).   This Part then contends that after a race neutral 
admissions policy has been implemented, it is easier for courts to review the effectiveness of that 
policy and thus to apply a higher standard of review such as strict scrutiny.   
 Part V proposes an alternative method to decide Fisher, the “unique contribution to 
diversity” test, which applies strict scrutiny.  The test proposed here does not treat “critical mass” 
in terms of numbers; in fact, it focuses on the race conscious admissions policy itself rather than 
on “critical mass.”  The “unique contribution to diversity” test assesses whether a race conscious 
policy contributes to diversity in a manner above and beyond any race neutral measures that are 
in place, such as the Top Ten Percent Law in Fisher.  The argument here is that UT should have 
to demonstrate explicitly that its race conscious policy is used to increase the variety of 
viewpoints and experiences among minority students—by admitting minority students in 
different majors, or from different cultural or socioeconomic backgrounds who are not admitted 
in sufficient numbers via the Top Ten Percent Law.  Such a goals-means fit is characteristic of 
strict scrutiny.  This Part then highlights the advantages of the “unique contribution to diversity” 
test and shows how the test addresses Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter.   Moreover, the test 
proposed here also resolves a values conflict that Justice Kennedy faces in Fisher: the prospect 
that a race neutral admissions policy (the Top Ten Percent Law) which generates diversity only 
because of rampant racial segregation in public schools, could preclude UT from using race 
conscious admissions measures.  This conflict is key for Justice Kennedy, who stated that 
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“avoiding racial isolation” is a compelling state interest in his concurrence in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.
16
 
 
I.  “Critical Mass” as a Compelling Interest: The Role of Diversity Within Racial Groups 
 
In 2003, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor authored the 5-4 majority opinion in Grutter, in 
which the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s holistic admissions policy.17  
Grutter adopted Justice Lewis Powell’s concurrence in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,
18
 which had introduced the idea of diversity in education as a compelling interest.
19
  The 
                                                          
16
 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007)(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)(stating that “[a] 
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation …”).  In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy also critiqued 
Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion for its  “all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a 
factor in instances when, in [Justice Kennedy’s] view, it may be taken into account.”  Id. at 787.  Justice Kennedy 
further asserted that “[t]o the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local 
school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.”  
Id. at 788.  For an excellent scholarly analysis and critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion in Parents 
Involved, see Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 206 
(2008)(noting that “[o]nce one seriously looks to the history of colorblind constitutionalism in the struggle that led 
to Brown … the shortcomings of the Chief Justice’s account [in Parents Involved] become readily apparent.”). 
17
 This Article defines a holistic admissions policy as one where various factors, from academic achievement to 
extracurricular activities to race, are subjectively considered together and weighed by admissions reviewers to make 
admissions decisions.  This can be contrasted with an admissions system which gives fixed weights to those various 
factors and applies objective, mechanical formulas to determine who should be admitted. 
18
  438 U.S. 265 (1978).  In Bakke, four Justices voted to strike down the University of California at Davis Medical 
School special admissions program, which set aside 16 of 100 spots in each admitted c lass for members of minority 
groups, and four Justice voted to uphold the admissions policy.  Justice Lewis Powell voted to strike down the UC-
Davis program, but wrote that race could be used as a “plus factor” for the compelling state interest of achieving 
diversity in education.  Id. at 317-18 (Powell, J.).  Subsequent to the Court’s ruling in Bakke, Powell’s concurring 
opinion was cited as support for the use of race as one of many “plus” factors in an admissions process.   
19
 Id. at 311-12 (Powell, J., concurring)(finding that “the attainment of a diverse student body … clearly is a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”).  In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy 
also made it clear that he did not object to the use of race in admissions to obtain the educational benefits of 
diversity.  See Grutter at 387-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The [Bakke concurring] opinion by  Justice Powell, in 
my view, states the correct rule for resolving [Grutter]. … Justice Powell's approval of the use of race in university 
admissions reflected a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a university's conception of its 
educational mission.  … Our precedents provide a basis for the Court's acceptance of a university's considered 
judgment that racial diversity among  students can further its educational task …”);  See also id. at 392-93 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)(“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest factor 
among many others to achieve diversity …”). 
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Court held that a holistic admissions policy could use race as one, flexible factor, for the purpose 
of admitting a “critical mass” of minority students.20  But what exactly is a “critical mass”?21   
This is a key question in understanding the constitutionality of race conscious 
admissions; yet, the answer remains elusive.  At the trial stage of Fisher v. Texas, Judge Sam 
Sparks of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas noted that “this esoteric 
critical mass of diversity of students”22 was a concept that “kept eluding him.”23  This Part 
reviews and critiques some different interpretations of the “critical mass” concept.  Then, 
drawing upon Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter, it argues that a “critical mass” 
refers to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences within racial groups.  Such within-group 
diversity is related to the specific compelling interest in diversity articulated in Grutter: the 
breakdown of racial stereotypes and promotion of cross-racial understanding.
24
  
                                                          
20
 Grutter at 308 (holding that “the Law School defines its critical mass concept by reference to the substantial, 
important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce, including cross-racial 
understanding and the breaking down of racial stereotypes.  … Thus, the Law School has a compelling interest in 
attaining a diverse student body.”). 
21
 See Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 97 (2007)(discussing 
uses of “critical mass” concept in law).  Professor Addis notes that “[i]n the scientific world, the [term “critical 
mass”] is used to refer to the precise minimum level of fissionable plutonium or uranium that is required to start and 
sustain a chain reaction of nuclear fission which will in turn lead to explosion.”  Id. at 98.  Professor Addis goes on 
to observe that:  
 
While there is a degree of certainty as to what the phrase refers in the scientific realm, there does not seem 
to be such clarity in relation to the application of the phrase in the social and political world. .. [I]t may 
even be that its popularity is … partly a function of its vagueness and elasticity that allow people to 
invoke it in various activities of social and political life.  Sometimes the phrase is used to refer to specific 
and empirically verifiable minimum numbers of people or levels of resources required for a social activity 
to succeed…  [o]ther times, however, the phrase seems to be used not as an analogy but as a metaphor, 
simply to indicate that people's actions or behavior depend on what others do or on what they expect others 
to do without an attempt to specify whether there is a minimum number or level of resource to trigger those 
actions or behavior.  Id. at 99. 
 
Professor Addis’s observations here show the flaws in directly analogizing between the scientific and social realms.  
This Article contends that the meaning of “critical mass” is context-specific, and that in Grutter, “critical mass” was 
intended merely as a metaphor to capture the notion of diversity within racial groups.  See infra Part I.C. 
22
 Adam Liptak, College Diversity Nears its Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, October 16, 2011, at SR4. 
23
 Id.   
24
 See Grutter at 330 (“[T]he Law School's admissions policy promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break 
down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.’”).  But see Grutter 
at 389, (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“[T]he concept of critical mass is … used … to achieve numerical goals 
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A.  Rejecting “Critical Mass” as a Racial Quota or Numerical Goal 
Critics of the Grutter ruling have viewed the concept of “critical mass” solely in 
numerical terms.  For example, Professor Lino Graglia argues that “[i]t is difficult to see, in any 
event, how a ‘critical mass,’ some minimum number of a racial group, avoids being a quota by 
not being more specifically defined.”25  In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy also stated that 
“critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an 
automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from 
quotas.”26   Independent of the University of Michigan Law School’s practices, however, it is 
important to delineate the theoretical distinction between “critical mass” and numerical goals. 
The Grutter majority affirmed Bakke’s rejection of racial quotas;27 thus, it could not have 
adopted a definition of “critical mass” based solely, or even primarily, on numbers or 
percentages of minority students.   Justice O’Connor’s opinion noted that “[e]nrolling a ‘critical 
mass’ of minority students simply to assure some specified percentage of a particular group 
merely because of its race or ethnic origin would be patently unconstitutional.”28  The Grutter 
majority did distinguish between a strict quota and a “permissible goal”;29 however, Justice 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
indistinguishable from quotas.”).  Justice Kennedy’s concern here underscores the need to clarify how “critical 
mass” is different from numerical goals. 
25
 Lino A. Graglia, Grutter and Gratz: Race Preference to Increase Racial Representation Held “Patently 
Unconstitutional” Unless Done Subtly Enough in the Name of Pursuing “Diversity”, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 2037, 2048 
(2004).  See also Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view of “critical mass,” infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
26
 Grutter at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy’s concern reflected the University of Michigan’s use of 
“critical mass” in practice, not an underlying concern with the theory of “critical mass” as entailing within-group 
diversity. See id. at 389-90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(discussing how the University of Michigan School of Law’s 
admissions numbers from 1987-1998 suggested that the school used numerical goals or racial quotas.).  Parts IV and 
V., infra, discuss how courts can review race conscious admissions policies more stringently.  
27
 Grutter at 334 (“As Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be 
used in a flexible, nonmechanical way.   It follows from this mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for 
members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admissions tracks.”)(internal citation 
omitted). 
28
 Id. at 308.   
29
 Id. at 335 (“In contrast [to a quota], ‘a permissible goal ... require[s] only a good-faith effort ... to come within a 
range demarcated by the goal itself[.]’”)(internal citation omitted). 
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Kennedy’s dissent did not accept this subtle distinction,30 and it would likely not survive further 
review in Fisher.
31
  Considering these circumstances, one can posit that Grutter allows “some 
attention to numbers,”32 but there must be more to the definition of “critical mass” to distinguish 
it from numerical goals. 
B.  “Critical Mass” as a Counter to Tokenism: A Relevant but Limited View 
 
During the trial phase of Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School contended that 
there is “no number, percentage, or range of numbers or percentages that constitute critical 
mass,”33  but it noted that “critical mass” entailed “numbers such that underrepresented minority 
students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.”34  Professor Bennett Capers 
contends that: 
[C]ritical mass is not solely numerical. Rather, a critical mass implies a climate 
where one is neither conspicuous nor on display, where one does not feel the 
opprobrium of being a token, nor the burden of being the designated 
representative for an entire group. It also implies a climate where one can speak 
freely, where one not only has a voice, but a voice that will be heard.
35
 
 
                                                          
30
 Id. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting “obvious tension between the pursuit of critical mass and the 
requirement of individual review” in the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy, and citing the 
Law School’s consultation of  “daily reports which indicated the composition of the incoming class along racial 
lines.”). 
31
 It is possible the Court could rule solely on the issue of deference to universities and not address the meaning of 
“critical mass.”  Nevertheless, if the Court does consider the “critical mass” issue, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent 
underscores his problems with the concept.  See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
32
 Id. at 335-36.  “The Law School's goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students does not 
transform its program into a quota. As the Harvard plan described by Justice Powell recognized, there is of course 
‘some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and 
between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students admitted.” … [but] … [s]ome attention 
to numbers, without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid quota.’”   
33
 Grutter at 318. 
34
 Id. at 319.  The Plaintiffs in Fisher also defined “critical mass” in similar terms.  See Br. Pl.s-Appellants 6, 
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Plaintiffs.5th.Circuit.Brief.pdf. (arguing that “critical mass”  is defined as 
“a sufficient number of underrepresented minority students such that such minority students would ‘not feel isolated 
or like spokespersons for their race.’”); Fisher at 243 (noting that the Plaintiffs contend that “the concept of critical 
mass is defined by the minimum threshold for minority students to have their ideas represented in class discussions 
and not to feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.”).   
35
 I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 How. L.J. 121, 122-23 (2004).  Professor Capers presents a more nuanced view, 
focusing on the climate for minority students rather than on numbers.  This Article agrees with Professor Capers’s 
point, but it contends that Grutter defined “critical mass” primarily in terms of the educational benefits of diversity.  
It is these educational benefits that are the compelling interest in Grutter.  See infra Part II.C. 
Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups  17 
 
It is very important for universities to acknowledge and address feelings of isolation and 
tokenism among minority students.  But for several reasons, this is not sufficient to define 
“critical mass” under Grutter.  First, “numbers such that underrepresented minority students do 
not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”36 still implies that “critical mass” can be 
defined by numbers, even if these numbers may vary or constitute a range rather than a set 
numerical goal.  This runs very close to Justice Kennedy’s concern that “critical mass is a 
delusion used by the Law School  … to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from 
quotas.”37  Second, studies suggest that minority students still do feel isolated and alienated on 
college campuses,
38
 so if this is the primary justification for race conscious admissions policies, 
then those policies may not be working.  This could raise questions about whether universities 
are actually fulfilling their compelling interest in diversity.
39
  Finally, while alleviating feelings 
of isolation and tokenism is important to attaining the educational benefits of diversity, the 
                                                          
36
 Grutter at 319. 
37
 Grutter at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Grutter did attempt to distinguish “critical mass” from racial quotas.  Id. 
at 335 (“In contrast [to a quota], ‘a permissible goal ... require[s] only a good-faith effort ... to come within a range 
demarcated by the goal itself[.]’”)(internal citation omitted).  However, Justice Kennedy did not accept this 
distinction, and it may well be raised again in Fisher.  In the Grutter oral argument, Justice Scalia asked  counsel for 
the University of Michigan whether two, four, or eight percent constitutes a “critical mass” and followed up by 
stating “You have to pick some number, don’t you?”  Transcript of Arguments in Grutter v. Bollinger, N.Y. Times, 
April 1, 2003, at 11, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/01/politics/02TEXT1.html?pagewanted=11 
Counsel for the University of Michigan responded, “No, Your Honor, if it was a fixed range that said that it will be a 
minimum of 8 percent, come hell or high water, no matter what the qualifications of these applicants look like, no 
matter what it is that the majority applicants could contribute to the benefits of diversity, then certainly that would 
be a quota, but that is not what occurred here. And in fact the testimony was undisputed, that this was not intended 
to be a fixed goal.”  Id.   Nevertheless, this Article argues that numbers alone are not sufficient to understand or 
apply the “critical mass” concept.  From the perspective of this Article, asking what percentage constitutes a “critical 
mass” is insufficient because it does not take into account the within-group diversity which is necessary to break 
down racial stereotypes and obtain the educational benefits of diversity. 
38
 See, e.g., Tara Yosso, William Smith, Miguel Ceja, & Daniel Solórzano, Critical Race Theory, Racial 
Microaggressions, and Campus Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 659, 659 
(2009)(examining “processes by which Latinas/os respond to racial microaggressions and confront hostile campus 
racial climates.”); Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise:An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning 
Affirmative Action, 85 Ind. L.J. 1197, 1233 (2010)(acknowledging “power of creating critical mass and a diverse 
classroom” but noting that “stigma and racism … were still present.”).  
39
 But see infra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that the University of Michigan Law School did not actually 
contend that it had enrolled a “critical mass” of minority students, but only that its admissions policy aimed toward 
that goal.).  It is possible that the Law School never attained an actual “critical mass,” where minority students no 
longer felt isolated.   This could well be a good argument to expand race conscious policies to admit more minority 
students, but Justice Kennedy and the Supreme Court are very unlikely to do so in Fisher. 
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Grutter majority opinion focused more directly on those educational benefits.
40
  In order to attain 
the educational benefits of diversity, universities must aim to create campus environments where 
minority students feel comfortable speaking and interacting with non-minority students.  But 
from the Grutter majority’s perspective, this is the means rather than the end, and it is not the 
defining feature of “critical mass.”41 
C.  The Grutter Majority’s Functional View of “Critical Mass”: Educational  
      Benefits of Within-Group Diversity  
    
 The Grutter majority further defined “critical mass” in functional terms:  
  [T]he Law School's concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the   
  educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce. … These benefits are  
  substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law School's admissions policy 
  promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes,  
  and “enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.”42 
 
Under this view, “critical mass” refers to a sufficiently diverse group of perspectives within each 
racial group to actualize the educational benefits of diversity.
43
  According to the Grutter 
majority, the goal of a race conscious admissions policy should be to produce a “critical mass” 
with a “variety of viewpoints among minority students.”44   Such within-group variation 
actualizes the educational benefits of diversity, as it serves to break down racial stereotypes: 
                                                          
40
 Grutter at 308 (“[T]he Law School defines its critical mass concept by reference to the substantial, important, and 
laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.”).    See also Fisher at 219 (noting that “critical 
mass” should be defined through “reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.”).  This 
Article contends that while the Fisher opinion claimed that “critical mass” should be defined in terms of the 
educational benefits of diversity, its application of the concept did not reflect this, and its articulation of these 
educational benefits was incomplete.  See infra Parts III.B. and III.D.  But even the Fisher Plaintiffs agree that 
“Grutter endorses an inward-facing concept of diversity that focuses on the functioning of the student body and the 
educational benefits that arise from admitting a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minority students [.]”  Br. Pl.s-
Appellants 33, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Plaintiffs.5th.Circuit.Brief.pdf 
41
 See infra Part I.C. 
42
 Grutter at 330.   
43
 See also id. (“[Educational] benefits [of diversity] are substantial … the Law School's admissions policy promotes 
“cross-racial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand 
persons of different races.’ … These benefits are ‘important and laudable,’ because ‘classroom discussion is livelier, 
more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting’ when the students have ‘the greatest possible variety of 
backgrounds.’”). 
44
 Id. at 320. 
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  when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is    
  present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn  
  there is no “minority viewpoint” but rather a variety of viewpoints among   
  minority students.
45
 
 
Grutter’s language thus suggests that “meaningful representation”46 is not just contingent upon 
numbers of minority students, but also includes sufficiently diverse experiences and perspectives 
within racial groups.
47
  This allows racial stereotypes to be broken down and facilitates the 
educational benefits of diversity, which are the constitutional justification for race conscious 
admissions policies in the first place.  When understood not only in terms of diverse 
representation of racial groups, but also different experiences and perspectives within racial 
groups, the concept of a “critical mass” of minority students is directly related to the compelling 
interest articulated in Grutter.
48
   
 1. Why “Critical Mass” Cannot Be Defined by Minority Student Numbers 
This emphasis on within-group diversity also clarifies how “critical mass” is different 
from numerical goals or quotas.  By definition, diversity within racial groups cannot be attained 
                                                          
45
 Id. at 319-20. See also id. at 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on ‘any belief that 
minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’ … To 
the contrary, diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one 
that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.”).  This language in Grutter speaks to the 
immediate, proximal impact of having a “critical mass.”  When evaluating “critical mass” in Fisher, the Fifth Circuit 
panel did not cite this language, instead defining the educational benefits of diversity in much broad terms: 1. 
“Increased Perspectives” - those brought by diverse groups of students into the classroom, which add valuable 
knowledge and make for engaging classroom discussions; 2. “Professionalism” – preparing students for “work and 
citizenship” by exposing them to diverse people and viewpoints; and 3. “Civic Engagement” – creating paths to 
leadership for individuals of every race and ethnicity.  See Fisher at 219-220 and infra notes 183 and 209-211 and 
accompanying text. 
46
 Grutter at 318. 
47
 Of course, there cannot be sufficient within-group diversity if there are not adequate numbers of a particular 
minority group.  However, no particular number or percentage of a given racial group automatically guarantees that 
within-group diversity is present.  That is an assessment that institutions must make themselves. 
48
 But see Edward C. Thomas, Comment, Racial Classification and the Flawed Pursuit of Diversity: How Phantom 
Minorities threaten "Critical Mass" Justification in Higher Education, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 813, 815-16 (arguing 
that “phantom minorities,” who take advantage of race conscious admissions policies even though they “look white, 
have Anglo names, and come from backgrounds void of racial-life experience,” undermine the “critical mass” 
justification for affirmative action.).  Thomas’s point underscores the need for admissions committees to consider 
race in the context of an applicant’s entire profile, in conjunction with other factors, and to use individualized review 
to consider how each applicant contributes to the educational benefits of diversity.  Regardless of whether this type 
of nuanced review is the current norm in university admissions, this Article argues that it is the standard that courts 
should enforce when evaluating universities’ race conscious admissions policies.  See infra Part IV. 
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merely by admitting particular numbers or percentages of students from each minority group, or 
even by monitoring the numbers of students admitted from such groups.
49
  Within-group 
diversity may involve “some attention to numbers,” 50 but universities must consider factors 
beyond race
 
to attain a variety of viewpoints and experiences within various racial groups.
51
  
This point is key to addressing Justice Kennedy’s concern about “critical mass,”52 because unlike 
the two views of “critical mass” posited earlier,53 within-group diversity cannot conceivably be 
defined by a number, percentage, or range of students from a minority group: it cannot be even 
expressed be expressed in such terms, as some account of variation within that group is 
necessary.
54
  Moreover, Part II infra will illustrate how Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles 
make much more sense in light of this view of “critical mass.” 
 2.  Why “Critical Mass” Can Vary for Different Minority Groups 
In his dissenting opinion in Grutter, the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, raised a more general question about “critical mass”: why 
were different numbers of students admitted for different racial groups?  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
noted that: 
                                                          
49
 This was another salient concern raised by Justice Kennedy.  See Grutter at 392(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The 
consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the admissions process suggests there was no further attempt at 
individual review save for race itself.   The admissions officers could use the reports to recalibrate the plus factor 
given to race depending on how close they were to achieving the Law School's goal of critical mass.   The bonus 
factor of race would then become divorced from individual review;  it would be premised instead on the numerical 
objective set by the Law School.”). 
50
 Grutter at 336. 
51
 See infra. Part II.C. 
52
 See supra notes 26 and 37and accompanying text. 
53
 See supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
54
 A quota or numerical goal is obviously expressed as a number or percentage, and there are numbers and 
percentages (e.g., 50% or 75%) which would have to be sufficient for group members not to feel isolated—leading 
to the inquiry posed by Justice Scalia in the Grutter oral argument: “You have to pick some number, don’t you?”  
Transcript of Arguments in Grutter v. Bollinger, N.Y. Times, April 1, 2003, at 11, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/01/politics/02TEXT1.html?pagewanted=11.  See also supra note 37.  Within-
group diversity, on the other hand, can never be determined by numbers or percentages.  To take an extreme 
example, even if 95% of the students in a class are members of a given group, the class might benefit from a 
member of that group who has very different viewpoints and experiences. 
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  [f]rom 1995 through 2000, the Law School admitted between 1,130 and 1,310  
  students. Of those, between 13 and 19 were Native American, between 91 and  
  108 were African-American, and between 47 and 56 were Hispanic. If the Law  
  School is admitting between 91 and 108 African-Americans in order to achieve  
  “critical mass,” thereby preventing African-American students from feeling  
  “isolated or like spokespersons for their race,” one would think that a number of  
  the same order of magnitude would be necessary to accomplish the same purpose  
  for Hispanics and Native Americans. Similarly, even if all of the Native American 
  applicants admitted in a given year matriculate, which the record demonstrates is  
  not at all the case, how can this possibly constitute a “critical mass” of Native  
  Americans in a class of over 350 students? In order for this pattern of admission  
  to be consistent with the Law School's explanation of “critical mass,” one would  
  have to believe that the objectives of “critical mass” offered by respondents are  
  achieved with only half the number of Hispanics and one-sixth the number of  
  Native Americans as compared to African-Americans. But respondents offer no  
  race-specific reasons for such disparities. Instead, they simply emphasize the  
  importance of achieving “critical mass,” without any explanation of why that  
  concept is applied differently among the three underrepresented minority   
  groups.
55
 
 
Professor Clark Cunningham echoes Chief Justice Rehnquist in lamenting the lack of response 
from other Justices to these critiques of the Law School’s admissions numbers.56  Both Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Professor Cunningham assume a numerical definition of “critical mass,” 
which the Grutter majority repudiated.
57
  Nevertheless, there are several possible responses to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s question. 
                                                          
55
 Grutter at 381(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).    
56
 Clark D. Cunningham, After Grutter Things Get Interesting! The American Debate over Affirmative Action is 
Finally Ready for Some Fresh Ideas from Abroad, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 665, 670 (2004)(“Although one wonders 
whether the Chief Justice actually would have voted to uphold the law school's affirmative action program as long as 
it had admitted larger numbers of Hispanic and Native American applicants, the evidence he cited would seem to 
call for a response. However, the majority opinion authored by Justice O'Connor did not really respond to either 
Justice Kennedy or Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns.”).   
 Justice O’Connor did actually respond directly to Chief Justice Rehnquist in her Grutter opinion.  539 U.S. 
at 336 (“THE CHIEF JUSTICE believes that the Law School's policy conceals an attempt to achieve racial 
balancing, and cites admissions data to contend that the Law School discriminates among different groups within the 
critical mass … But, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE concedes, the number of underrepresented minority students who 
ultimately enroll in the Law School differs substantially from their representation in the applicant pool and varies 
considerably for each group from year to year. “).  Justice O’Connor’s response suggests that “critical mass” can 
vary because it is not just about numbers of minority students, but about the diverse viewpoints and experiences 
within each minority group—a mix that varies substantially from year to year.   
57
 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.  See also Fisher at 219 (“In his [Grutter] dissent, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist saw critical mass as only the minimum level necessary ‘[t]o ensure that the[ ] minority students do not 
feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race;  to provide adequate opportunities for the type of interaction upon 
which the educational benefits of diversity depend;  and to challenge all students to think critically and reexamine 
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First, in Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School did not actually contend that it 
had reached a “critical mass” of any minority group, but rather only that its race conscious 
admissions policy “seeks” to attain this “goal.”58  It is possible that the number of Native 
Americans admitted was limited by the number of Native American applicants.  Moreover, even 
if there were more Native American applicants who could have been admitted, the University 
was limited by the finite consideration it could give to race in the admissions process, lest race 
become too large of a factor and render the policy unconstitutional.
59
  Justice Kennedy in 
particular emphasized that race should not be the “predominant factor” in admissions.60  Thus, 
the Law School could not have categorically admitted every Native American student without 
violating Grutter’s own narrow tailoring principles for race conscious admissions policies.  
Attaining a “critical mass” of a minority group was one of the University’s goals, but that goal 
had to be balanced with other priorities.
61
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
stereotypes.’  On this view, critical mass is defined only as a proportion of the student body, and the percentage that 
suffices for one minority group should also suffice for another group. …  In contrast, Justice O'Connor, writing for 
the Court [in Grutter], explained that critical mass must be ‘defined by reference to the educational benefits that 
diversity is designed to produce.’”)(internal citations omitted). 
58
 See Grutter at 329 (“As part of its goal of ‘assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and 
broadly diverse,’ the Law School seeks to “enroll a ‘critical mass’ of minority students.”’)(emphasis added).  The 
University of Michigan Law School’s brief in Grutter also suggests that enrollment of a “critical mass” is a “hope” 
rather than an outcome it attains each year.  See Brief of Respondents at 13, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 402236 (“[T]he Law School hopes that its policy will enroll a "critical mass" of 
minority students.”)(emphasis added). 
59
 See Grutter at 334 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system-it 
cannot ‘insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other 
applicants.’ Bakke, 438 U.S., at 315, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.).  Instead, a university may consider race 
or ethnicity only as a ‘ “plus” in a particular applicant's file,’ without ‘insulat[ing] the individual from comparison 
with all other candidates for the available seats.’”).   
60
 Grutter at 392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race 
as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity, but an educational institution must ensure, through 
sufficient procedures, that … race does not become a predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.”).  It 
should be noted that the Plaintiff’s expert witness in Grutter conceded that “race is not the predominant 
factor in the Law School's admissions calculus.”  Id. at 320.   
61
 See Brief of Respondents at 42-43, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 402236 
(“The Law School's desire for a ‘critical mass’ of students from otherwise underrepresented minority groups is only 
one of many educational goals pursued through the admissions policy, and it is at all times weighed against other 
educational objectives.  Dean Lehman and the other trial witnesses testified unequivocally that the Law School 
would and does regularly reject qualified minority candidates, even if that risks falling short of a critical mass … .”). 
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 In that vein, not only is there a limited applicant pool, but there are also a limited number 
of spots in any admitted class.  An institution must make decisions about which perspectives are 
most important to achieving its desired educational benefits, and this can lead to different 
numbers of students admitted from various racial groups.   As part of its educational autonomy, 
an institution must also determine which of many diverse perspectives is most important in 
breaking down racial stereotypes and promoting the other educational benefits of diversity.
62
  For 
example, a university in Arizona or New Mexico may determine that more perspectives from 
Mexican Americans are necessary, given the large Mexican American populations in those 
states.  Similarly, an institution in South Dakota may choose to emphasize perspectives from 
Native Americans to a greater extent.  Local history and social and political dynamics determine 
both the prevalence of racial stereotypes in a given area, and the particular mix of perspectives 
necessary to help break down those stereotypes and facilitate cross-racial understanding.  Even at 
elite universities with national student bodies, there is significant variation in local and 
institutional history and social dynamics.
63
   
                                                          
62
 Grutter at 329 (“In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice 
Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational 
autonomy:  ‘The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its 
student body.’  …  From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming ‘the right to select those students 
who will contribute the most to the “robust exchange of ideas,” ’ a university ‘seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of 
paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.’")(internal citations omitted). 
63
 For example, some Ivy League universities, such as Yale, Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania, are 
located in urban communities that are predominantly African American, whereas others, such as Cornell and 
Dartmouth, are located in rural, predominantly White communities.  Moreover, institutional history can also play a 
significant role: for example, the charter for Dartmouth aimed to create an institution “for the education and 
instruction of Youth of the Indian Tribes in this Land ... and also of English Youth and any others.”  See About the 
Native American Program, Dartmouth University, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nap/about/ (last updated March 26, 
2012).  Since 1970, when then President John G. Kemeny of Dartmouth renewed the institution’s commitment to 
Native Americans, “nearly 700 Native Americans from over 200 different tribes have attended Dartmouth, more 
than at all the other Ivy League institutions combined.”  Id. 
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Thus, universities are in the best position to determine the mix of students that constitutes 
a “critical mass” of diverse perspectives.64  Even if “critical mass” could be conceptualized 
solely in terms of numbers of minority students,
65
 a university cannot possibly admit a “critical 
mass” of every group.  There are too many different racial/ethnic groups with varying 
experiences and perspectives, all of which could contribute to the educational benefits of 
diversity.  Moreover, enrollment of minority students may be limited by other factors, such as the 
availability of financial aid.
66
  Given limited resources and the limited size of its admitted class, a 
university must make its own judgments about which perspectives should be included and are 
most central to its educational mission
67
--so long as any race conscious admissions policies it 
employs adhere to Grutter’s guidelines.  In fact, this is the reason for Grutter’s deference to 
colleges and universities in the admissions process.
68
 
 Finally, in terms of minority students feeling “isolated or like spokespersons for their 
race,”69 Justice Rehnquist failed to consider that members of one minority group may help 
members of other minority groups feel less isolated.  For example, if there are African American 
and Latino students in a class who speak up and share their views, then a Native American 
student may feel more emboldened to do so.  In fact, minority student organizations regularly 
                                                          
64
 See Fisher at 39 (“[T]here is no reason to assume that critical mass will or should be the same for every racial 
group or university.”).  Alternatively, a university might also decide that racial stereotypes of a specific group—for 
example, African Americans—are particularly pervasive and pernicious on a broader level, and that the breakdown 
of those stereotypes is central to its educational mission.  Racial stereotypes are perpetuated by both local 
circumstances and the national media, and there is no prescription for how to best break them down. 
65
 See supra notes 27-29 for a discussion of why “critical mass” cannot be defined numerically. 
66
 See Osamudia James, Dog Wags Tail: The Continuing Viability of Minority-Targeted Aid in Higher Education, 85 
IND. L.J. 851, 853 (2010)(noting that “actually enrolling a critical mass of minority students … [is] … a goal that is 
often unattainable without financial aid.”). 
67
 See supra notes 63-64. 
68
 See Grutter at 329-330 (“Our holding [in Grutter] is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference 
to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits. … ‘good faith’ on the part of a 
university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”). 
69
 Id. at 319. 
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collaborate on activities and interact and support one another at many institutions of higher 
education.
70
  
3.  Can “Critical Mass” be Measured At All? 
It is important to note that while Grutter allows “some attention to numbers,”71 this 
Article argues that “critical mass” is not readily measurable in practice.  As noted, attaining a 
“critical mass” requires an admissions committee to look to other factors beyond race,72 so mere 
numbers or percentages of minority students would not allow one to determine if a “critical 
mass” is present.  Based on the interaction of various demographic characteristics and life 
experiences (including those involving race), Grutter envisioned that a given student may 
express one or more perspectives or characteristics that add to the mix of ideas in an admitted 
class.
73
  The student’s unique contribution in this milieu depends in part on the other perspectives 
represented in the applicant pool; thus, it is not possible to accurately predict ex ante how many 
students of a given group are necessary to meet the goals of attaining the educational benefits of 
                                                          
70
 For example, since 1978, undergraduate student of color organizations at the University of Pennsylvania (where 
the author attended graduate school) have formed an umbrella group called the United Minorities Coalition, which 
sponsors events that promote unity among various minority groups.  See http://www.dolphin.upenn.edu/umc/  White 
students are also sometimes involved in these coalitions; for example, at Penn, there is a Black-Jewish student 
coalition called Alliance and Understanding.  See http://www.vpul.upenn.edu/gic/au.php 
Additionally, at NYU School of Law, the various student of color organizations—the Black Allied Law 
Students Association (BALSA), Latino Law Students Association (LLSA), Asian Pacific American Law Students 
Association (APALSA), South Asian Law Students Association (SALSA), and the Multiracial Law Students 
Association (MuLSA)—held an “All-ALSA” Symposium in 2008 entitled “Can People of Color Become a United 
Coalition?”  See Vinay Harpalani, Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Awakening: A South Asian Becoming “Critically” 
Aware of Race in America, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 71, 82 (2009).  These organizations have also 
formed an “All-ALSA” Coalition and regularly meet and collaborate on events.  See, e.g., “All ALSA Coalition 
Graduation and Reception,” “http://its.law.nyu.edu/eventcalendar/index.cfm?fuseaction=main.detail&id=18723.  
Also, the Black, Latino, Asian Pacific Alumni Association (BLAPA) serves the same purpose for alumni of NYU 
School of Law.  See http://www.law.nyu.edu/alumni/alumniassociations/blapa/index.htm 
71
 Grutter at 336. 
72
 Id. at 337 (“[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving 
serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.”). 
73
 Grutter at 309 (“The Law School's admissions program …  is flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is 
evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes race or ethnicity the defining feature of the application.  … 
The Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. There is no policy, 
either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft” variable. … [T]he program 
adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race.”). 
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diversity.  Moreover, these benefits may vary based on local history, demographics, and politics, 
or the institution’s history and educational mission, all of which can also change over time.  
Thus, “critical mass” may vary by institution and may vary over time with local and national 
demographic changes.  As noted, it may also be different for different racial groups.
74
    
Because of these complexities, it would be difficult to devise a consistent judicial 
standard to determine whether an institution has attained a “critical mass.”75  In theory, one 
might devise an index of various types of diversity—socioeconomic, geographic, experiential, 
political, etc.—and aim to measure diversity within racial groups, in addition to the numbers of 
students from each racial group.  In practice, however, this would be a difficult and subjective 
enterprise for a court to undertake; it is best left to university admissions committees who can 
assess these factors and local conditions more effectively.  This is why Grutter entrusts colleges 
and university admissions committees to employ “good faith” when using race as a factor in the 
admissions process.
76
   
Because “critical mass” cannot be readily measured, this Article argues that it is merely 
part of the definition of Grutter’s compelling interest, not part of the narrow tailoring test for 
race conscious admissions policies.
77
  This does not mean, however, that there is no room for 
                                                          
74
 See supra Part I.C.2; Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213, 238 (5th Cir. 2011)(“The educational benefits recognized in 
Grutter go beyond the narrow ‘pedagogical concept’ urged by Appellants. On this understanding, there is no reason 
to assume that critical mass will or should be the same for every racial group or every university.”).   
75
 When Fisher was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, the amicus brief of the Mountain States Legal Foundation  made a 
similar claim.  See Brief for Mountain States Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae at 14, Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 
213 (5th Cir. 2011)(“[B]ecause critical mass cannot be quantified, no court is able to determine whether a critical 
mass is present or lacking.”).  Available 
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Amicus.Mountain.States.Legal.Foundation.pdf 
76
 Cf. Grutter at 309-10. (“The Court takes the Law School at its word that it would like nothing better than to find a 
race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its use of racial preferences as soon as practicable.”). 
77
 UT contended that the Fisher Plaintiffs framed “critical mass” as part of both the compelling interest and narrow 
tailoring prongs of strict scrutiny.  Appellees’ Br. at 43 (“Plaintiffs contend that UT’s revised admissions policy is 
not narrowly tailored because … it was not needed for UT to enroll a critical mass of underrepresented 
minorities. (At times, Plaintiffs refer to this as a “compelling interest” argument, and at other times they characterize 
it as a “narrow tailoring” argument. But the argument is meritless regardless of  nomenclature.).”  The argument for 
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more stringent judicial review of race conscious admissions policies in Fisher v. Texas, as Parts 
IV and V infra will show. 
 
II.  Within-Group Diversity, Narrow Tailoring and Deference: Reducing Stigmatic Harm 
 
Grutter stands in contrast with much of the Supreme Court’s recent race and affirmative 
action jurisprudence.   In the two decades preceding Grutter, the Court was much more apt to 
strike down race conscious policies.
78
  Since 2003, the Court has narrowed the scope of Grutter 
to higher education.
79
  The Court’s deviation in Grutter has largely been attributed to the unique 
educational benefits of student diversity at colleges and universities.
80
   
However, another factor that distinguished Grutter from other affirmative action cases 
was the flexible, unquantified manner in which the University of Michigan Law School used 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
resolving Fisher posed by this Article is not contingent upon whether “critical mass” is considered part of the 
compelling interest or narrow tailoring prong.  See infra Parts IV and V.   
78
 Justice O’Connor herself had authored numerous opinions which invalidated race conscious policies under the 
Equal Protection Clause.   See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986)(O’Connor, J., 
concurring)(striking down “layoff provision” which preserved jobs of minority teachers with less seniority); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)(striking down City of Richmond’s minority set-aside program 
for contracts);  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)(striking down  North Carolina’s congressional redistricting 
plan because “[r]acial classifications … pose the risk of lasting harm to our society … [because] … [t]hey reinforce 
the belief … that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. … [r]acial gerrymandering, even for 
remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions.”).  Even in the few cases where the Court 
upheld race conscious policies, Justice O’Connor had dissented.  See U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)(upholding “one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement.”); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)(upholding race conscious policies implemented by Federal 
Communications Commission.).  
79
 See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 765 (2007)(striking 
race conscious public school assignment plans in Seattle and Louisville and noting that in Grutter, the Court’s 
“deference [in the use of race] was prompted by factors uniquely relevant to higher education.”). 
80
 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 60, 60 (2004) 
(noting that “in Grutter, the Court spelled out in some detail the potential educational advantages of student 
diversity…thus…grounding in social science…the advantages Justice Powell had asserted [in Bakke] on the basis of 
less evidence.”).  Professor also Karst highlighted the role of three amicus briefs—one from military leaders, 
another from business leaders, and a third from organized labor—in facilitating the Court’s acceptance of diversity 
in education as a compelling state interest.  Id. at at 66-69.  See also Marcia G. Synnott, The Evolving Diversity 
Rationale in University Admissions: From Regents v. Bakke to the University Of Michigan Cases, 90 Cornell L. 
Rev. 463, 493 (2005)(“Justice O'Connor's majority opinion recognized that race may also be used in an inclusive 
way to achieve diversity that is beneficial to white and minority students alike.”); Colin S. Diver, From Equality to 
Diversity: The Detour from Brown to Grutter,  2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691, 699 (2004) (“In her opinion for the Grutter 
majority, Justice O'Connor variably characterizes the state's interests as: ‘obtaining 'the educational benefits that 
flow from a diverse student body’'; ‘attaining a diverse student body’; and ‘assembling a class that is both 
exceptionally academically qualified and broadly diverse.’”). 
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race—in the context of its holistic admissions policy.  Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion laid 
out several criteria for narrowly tailored, race conscious, holistic admissions policies: 
individualized consideration of all applicants, flexible, non-mechanical use of race, no insulation 
from competition based on race, no undue harm or burden to non-minority applicants, and 
“sunset” provisions to eventually end race conscious policies.81 While many commentators have 
criticized its treatment of narrow tailoring as a deviation from the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence,
82
 this Part explains Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles in terms of minimizing 
the stigmatic harm of race conscious admissions policies—a goal that is consistent with the 
Court’s recent race jurisprudence.   Additionally, this Part illustrates how Grutter’s narrow 
tailoring principles are related to the “critical mass” concept and particularly to diversity within 
racial groups—thus providing internal logic and coherence to the much maligned Grutter 
majority opinion.
83
  
 A.  Overview of Stigmatic Harm 
 To explain Grutter’s theory of narrow tailoring, it is first necessary to define “stigmatic 
harm.”  In the Supreme Court’s recent race jurisprudence, stigmatic harm can be understood as 
the harm that occurs when a government policy reinforces racial stereotypes.  For example, 
Justice O’Connor, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., describes this harm: 
Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm … they may in fact 
promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility … 
reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve 
                                                          
81
 Grutter at 334, 341-42 (describing the features of a narrowly tailored race conscious admissions policy).  
82
 See, e.g., Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. 
LAW REV. 517 (2007)(arguing that Grutter deviates from the traditional “least restrictive means” test of narrow 
tailoring); David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action Cases: Reconsidering the Supreme 
Court's Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based Decision-Making by Individualized Discretion, 56 FLA. L. 
REV. 483, 538 (2004)(arguing that in Gratz and Grutter, “the Court performed poorly in defining narrow tailoring.  
The majority spent most of its effort explaining what narrow tailoring is not, and little in defining what it is.”). 
83
 See supra note 11. 
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success without special protection based on a factor having no relation to 
individual worth
84
 
 
The harm espoused here is a constitutional harm, not a tangible or psychological one.
85
  Some 
commentators have embraced the view that race conscious policies directly stigmatize and inflict 
psychological harms upon minorities, and this is a debated issue.
86
  However, the presence or 
absence of any such psychological harms or other tangible effects is not the relevant issue.  The 
Court’s recent race jurisprudence describes constitutional stigmatic harm as that which occurs 
when government action itself reinforces racial stereotypes; the tangible results of such action 
are not relevant to the constitutional analysis.  As Justice O’Connor noted in her dissenting 
opinion in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
Social scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and behavior reflect their 
background, but the Constitution provides that the Government may not allocate 
                                                          
84
 488 U.S. at 494. 
85
 This notion of stigmatic harm is very similar to the definition of “expressive harm” articulated by Professors 
Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi: 
An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, 
rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the action brings about. On this view, the 
meaning of a governmental action is just as important as what that action does. Public policies can violate 
the Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning they 
convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values. 
Richard Pildes & Richard Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 507-8 (1993).  Professors Pildes and Niemi 
further note that the “harm is not concrete to particular individuals,” but rather “lies in the disruption to 
constitutionally underwritten public understandings about the appropriate structure of values.”  Id. at 507. 
86
  See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 11 at 435 (contending that race conscious admissions policies “stigmatize the so-
called beneficiaries in the eyes of their classmates, teachers, and themselves …”); Richard H. Sander, The Racial 
Paradox of the Corporate Law, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1755, 1812 (2006) (arguing that partners in law firms “have low 
expectations of black associates”); Grutter at 373 (Thomas, J., dissenting)(“[T]he majority of blacks are admitted to 
the Law School because of discrimination, and because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving. This problem of 
stigma does not depend on determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the ‘beneficiaries’ of racial 
discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is an open 
question today whether their skin color played a part in their advancement. The question itself is the stigma-because 
either racial discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it 
did not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed without 
discrimination.”).  Joshua Levine, Comment, Stigma's Opening: Grutter's Diversity Interest(s) and the New 
Calculus for Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 457, 487 (2006)(referring to Justice Clarence 
Thomas as “a black person who has felt stigmatic harm from others questioning his competency and pressuring him 
to conform to racial stereotypes.”).  But see Angela Onwauchi-Willig, Emily Houh, & Mary Campbell, Cracking the 
Egg: Which Came First--Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1346 (2008) (arguing that 
“affirmative action policies do not in fact ‘harm’ students of color in the way that opponents of affirmative action 
have claimed.”).   
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benefits and burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or 
ethnicity determines how they act or think.
87
 
Thus, stigmatic harm as conceptualized in the Court’s jurisprudence occurs when a government 
policy treats individuals in the same manner based on racial group membership, regardless of the 
negative or positive consequences for minorities (or for non-minorities).
88
   
B.  Grutter’s Theory of Narrow Tailoring 
 Having defined stigmatic harm, this Part now illustrates how Grutter’s narrow tailoring 
principles aim to minimize the stigmatic harm of its race conscious policies.   
1.  The Gratz/Grutter Distinction 
At the same time it upheld the Law School’s admissions policy in Grutter, the Court 
struck down the University of Michigan’s race conscious admissions policy for the College of 
Letters, Sciences, and Arts (LSA) in Gratz v. Bollinger.
89
  The Gratz plan relied on a fixed 
weight point system rather than a flexible, holistic admissions process; LSA’s admissions policy 
automatically awarded 20 points on a 150 point scale to applicants from underrepresented 
minority groups,
90
 a measure the Court found to be too rigid and mechanical—failing to “provide 
… individualized consideration.”91   
                                                          
87
 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Also, in Shaw v. Reno, 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion noted that “an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our 
society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally 
bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs.” 509 U.S. 630, 643.  Professors Pildes and Niemi argue that 
Shaw is rooted in the notion that “the state has impermissibly endorsed too dominant a role for race,” and that the 
decision “might rest on the intrinsic ground that the endorsement is wrong, in and of itself,” or “on the instrumental 
ground that this state endorsement threatens to reshape social perceptions along similar lines.”  Pildes and Niemi, 
supra n., at 509. 
88
  For an alternative view of racial stigmatic harms, see Robin A. Leinhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, 
Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2004)(arguing “that stigmatic harm occurs when a 
given act or policy sends the message that racial difference renders a person or a group inferior to Whites, the 
category constructed as the racial norm.”).  This Article does not question the validity of Professor Leinhardt’s 
proposition; it merely contends that the Supreme Court has a different view of stigmatic harm, as apparent in its race 
jurisprudence, including Grutter.  See supra Part II.A. 
89
 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
90
 Id. at 255. 
91
 Id. at 271. 
Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups  31 
 
Various scholars have critiqued the Court’s distinction between Gratz and Grutter.92  
Professor Cass Sunstein contends that:  
[I]n the context of affirmative action, Justice O'Connor's … judgment has led her 
to a puzzling and probably indefensible conclusion. It is hardly clear that the 
Constitution should be taken to require a procedure that sacrifices transparency, 
predictability, and equal treatment—and that does so while imposing significant 
burdens on officials who must evaluate particular applications for admission.
93
 
 
Professor Sunstein attributes Justice O’Connor’s Grutter decision to her general “holistic 
practice,”94 shown through judicial minimalism and a “preference for case-by-case judgment.”95  
Professor Heather Gerkin espouses a different view, emphasizing stealth as value embraced in 
the Grutter approach to race conscious admissions.
96
  
While these are valid perspectives, another explanation for the Gratz-Grutter distinction 
can be found in the Court’s attempt to minimize the stigmatic harm of race preferences.97  In 
Gratz, the majority noted that the “LSA policy does not provide … individualized consideration 
… [because it] … automatically distributes 20 points to every single applicant from an 
                                                          
92
 See, e.g., Ayres & Foster, supra note 82; Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1899, 
1902 (2006); David Crump, The Narrow Tailoring Issue in the Affirmative Action Cases: Reconsidering the 
Supreme Court's Approval in Gratz and Grutter of Race-Based Decision-Making by Individualized Discretion, 56 
Fla. L. Rev. 483, 528-29 (2004)(“ One can argue that the undergraduate Michigan program at issue in Gratz, 
involving a fixed-point system, should have been regarded as constitutionally superior to the unlimited discretion 
model in Grutter.  … At least in such a system the invidious exercise of discretion has been structured, confined, 
and checked. … The point system used in the undergraduate program struck down in Gratz should instead have been 
preferred because it makes the racial remedy visible … [.]”). 
93
 Sunstein, supra note 92,  at 1902. 
94
  Id. at 1901.  
95
  Id. 
96
 See Gerkin, supra note 6, at 104 (characterizing Justices Powell and O'Connor’s views as “something akin to a 
‘don't ask, don't tell’ approach to race-conscious decisionmaking: use race, but don't be obvious about it.”).(internal 
citation omitted). 
97
 See Michelle Adams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1941, 1953 
(2004)(arguing that in Grutter, “the Court was more concerned with how the Law School's application process 
actually appeared and the message that it sent to the public than with its impact on any particular white applicant.  In 
this way, Justice O'Connor's acceptance of the Law School's application process in Grutter is consistent with her 
rejection of the bizarrely shaped electoral districts in Shaw v. Reno. … In Grutter, as in Shaw, the message 
communicated by the governmental action was paramount.”).  Joshua Levine also notes that Grutter’s narrow 
tailoring principles may reduce stigmatic harm.  See Levine, supra note 86, at 520 (“[I]f race truly is ‘one of many’ 
factors and acts only as a small ‘plus’--such that the applicant and others can never really know whether race played 
a role in one's admission, then it is possible the stigmatic harm would be reduced.”).  However, Levine’s definition 
of “stigmatic harm” is broader than one posed in this Article, as it encompasses tangible harm to minority 
applicants.   See supra Part II.B. 
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‘underrepresented minority’ group, as defined by the University.”98  In contrast to the LSA 
policy struck down in Gratz, the Law School admissions policy upheld in Grutter did not use a 
point system; rather, it considered race subjectively as one element of a holistic admissions 
process.
99
  Minority applicants did not all receive the same benefit and race was considered along 
with other factors to determine its place in the overall evaluation.
100
  Grutter’s requirements for a 
narrowly tailored, holistic admissions program—individualized review, flexible use of race, 
consideration of factors other than race, preference for race neutral alternatives, and “sunset” 
provisions to gradually phase out race conscious policies—all reflect a principle of minimizing 
stigmatic harm.  Grutter held that “truly individualized consideration demands that race be used 
in a flexible, nonmechanical way.”101   The decision contemplates that race will be considered as a 
“plus” factor only in the context of a given applicant’s other characteristics,102 and individualized 
review of all applicants is required to determine if and how race should serve as a “plus 
factor.”103   These provisions serve to minimize stigmatic harm by ensuring that beyond the 
holistic, individually variable consideration of race, minority students are not treated differently 
than non-minority students.
104
  Grutter also requires colleges and universities to undertake “good 
                                                          
98
 Gratz at 271. 
99
 Grutter at 337(“[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, 
giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment … 
[u]nlike the program at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger … the Law School awards no mechanical, predetermined 
diversity ‘bonuses’ based on race or ethnicity.”). 
100
 Grutter at 336-37. (“When using race as a “plus” factor in university admissions, a university's admissions 
program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way 
that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application. The importance of this 
individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount. See Bakke, 438 
U.S., at 318, n. 52, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.) (identifying the “denial ... of th[e] right to individualized 
consideration” as the “principal evil” of the medical school's admissions program).”). 
101
 Grutter at 337.   
102
 Id. at 337.  (“[T]he Law School's race-conscious admissions program adequately ensures that all factors that may 
contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions decisions.”).  
103
 Id. at 334. (“Universities can … consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a “plus” factor in the context of 
individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”). 
104
 Cf. Paul Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of 
Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 928 (1983)(“The indirectness of the less explicitly numerical systems 
may have significant advantages, not so much in terms of the processes of consideration as in the felt impact of their 
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faith” consideration of race neutral alternatives to the race conscious admissions policy,105 and to 
periodically review the policy to determine if it is still necessary.
106
  Here, Grutter recognized 
that any preferential treatment based on race creates stigmatic harm and should be phased out 
eventually.
107
   
In these ways, Grutter’s mandate that “the importance of individualized consideration in 
the context of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount”108 was consistent with the 
view in Croson and Shaw that “individual worth” should predominate over race.109  While the 
cases differ in that the former upheld a race conscious policy and the latter two did not, all of 
them reflect a broader principle of avoiding or minimizing stigmatic harm.   
Scholarly analysis has generally not examined this aspect of Grutter
110—probably 
because Grutter did not strike down a race conscious policy, and because some commentators 
view Grutter’s narrow tailoring provisions as a smokescreen that merely hides racial quotas and 
race balancing,
111
 or at least serves mainly to hide the use of race rather than to insure that race is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
operation over time. The description of race as simply ‘another factor’ among a lot of others considered in seeking 
diversity tends to minimize the sense that minority students are separate and different and the recipients of special 
dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and structured systems might have the opposite effect.”).  
Professor Mishkin focused here on advantages of the perception that race is used in a flexible, individualized 
manner.  In contrast, this Article focuses on advantages of actually using race in such a manner. 
105
  Grutter at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does … require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral 
alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”). 
106
 Id. at 342 (“In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in 
race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary 
to achieve student body diversity.”). 
107
 Id. 
108
 Id. at 227. 
109
 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
110
 Two exceptions are Professor Michelle Adams and Joshua Levine, supra note 97. 
111
 See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 25, at 2048 (2004).  In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy also expresses a similar 
view.  See Grutter at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“[T]he Law School … attempt[s] to make race an automatic 
factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”).  This Article only aims to 
articulate the theory underlying Grutter and to apply this theory to Fisher v. Texas.  The Article takes no position on 
whether the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy actually adhered to this theory based on the 
facts in Grutter. 
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actually used in a flexible, individualized manner.
112
  Part IV will discuss how courts can review 
race conscious policies more stringently under Grutter. 
 2.  Least Restrictive Means as the “Least Stigmatic Means”  
 Professors Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster provide another critique of Grutter’s narrow 
tailoring requirements.  They argue that the Grutter ruling deviated from prior constitutional 
doctrine requiring government use of suspect classifications to employ the “least restrictive 
means.”113  In their view, narrow tailoring of race conscious admissions policies should require 
the “minimum necessary preference” to achieve sufficient diversity.114  Part V infra will discuss 
these issues further. 
Professor Ayres and Foster also contend that the Grutter admissions plan gave more 
weight to race than the plan struck down in Gratz,
115
 and thus did not employ the “minimum 
necessary preference.”116  Assuming that Professor Ayres and Foster are correct in their 
assessment of weight given to race, one can posit that under Grutter, stigmatic harm is not 
determined solely by the weight of race preferences (although that is a factor),
117
 but also by the 
                                                          
112
 See supra notes 96 and 104, and accompanying text. 
113
 Ayres and Foster, supra note 82, at 523 n.28 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that state action which employs 
“'suspect classifications' is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling 
government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.”).  Ayres and Foster conced 
that “[s]ome older cases include language suggesting that strict scrutiny does not demand use of the least restrictive 
means[,]” but they contend that “[i]n light of more recent cases demanding consideration of race-neutral alternatives 
and applying a stricter version of strict scrutiny, however, these cases are no longer good law with respect to this 
point.”  Id.  Nevertheless, for a different view of narrow tailoring, see Jeb Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action,  107 Yale 
L.J. 427, 438 (1997)(noting that strict scrutiny in recent equal protection jurisprudence can be viewed as  “a cost-
benefit justificatory test … [which] … serve[s] to determine whether a law that causes acknowledged constitutional 
harms is justified by sufficiently important benefits that a less constitutionally costly … law could not have 
achieved.”). 
114
 Id. at 521. 
115
 Ayres and Foster, supra note 82 at 534(concluding that “the Law School gave more weight to race than the 
College.”).  See also infra Part V.B.2 (discussing weight given to race in admissions as an limiting principle for race 
conscious admissions policies).   
116
 See id. 
117
 This Article builds on Professors Pildes and Niemi’s analysis by arguing that the stigmatic harm associated with 
government use of race accrues not only when race has too dominant a role, but also when it is used in a manner that 
promotes stereotyping by treating all of individuals of the same race in exactly the same way (e.g., by using a 
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manner in which those preferences are applied.  A flexible, holistic admissions process with 
individualized review creates less stigmatic harm than a fixed, weight point system, even if the 
latter gives less overall weight to race, because flexibility and individualized review ensure—to 
the greatest extent possible—that all applicants from a given group will not be treated exactly the 
same merely because of their race.
118
  Professor Ayres and Foster do acknowledge that narrow 
tailoring inquiry can vary by context,
119
 and in this context, the Grutter majority created a least 
stigmatic means principle—a standard that defines narrow tailoring in terms of minimizing the 
stigmatic harm of race conscious admissions policies.
120
   
C.  Within-Group Diversity and Grutter’s Internal Logic 
 “Critical mass” and Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles are essentially two sides of the 
same coin, and considering them together shows the internal logic and coherence of the Grutter 
opinion.  A “critical mass” of minority students, which includes sufficient diversity of 
viewpoints and experiences within each racial group, facilitates the educational benefits of 
diversity that Grutter held as a compelling interest: breaking down racial stereotypes and 
promoting cross-racial understanding and dialogue.
121
  Grutter recognized that these benefits are 
tangible and important, and that race conscious admissions policies are necessary to attain them. 
 At the same time, however, Grutter recognized the stigmatic harm of using race 
conscious admissions policies and how they could reinforce the very stereotypes that a “critical 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mechanical point system such as the one struck down in Gratz).  Grutter essentially prioritizes the latter concern 
over the former. 
118
  As noted earlier, some commentators, including Justice Kennedy, claim that Grutter’s narrow tailoring 
principles allow universities to hide their use of quotas and point systems under the guise of  holistic admissions.  
See supra notes 25 and 111 and accompanying text.  To the extent this is true, courts must be more vigilant in 
enforcing Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles, and emphasizing within-group diversity aids in this process.  See 
infra Parts II.C. and IV. 
119
 Ayres and Foster, supra note 82, at 577 (“[T]he narrow tailoring inquiry has always had multiple dimensions.”).  
See also Grutter at 333-34 (“[T]he contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry with respect to race-conscious university 
admissions programs … must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body 
diversity in public higher education.”).  Ayers and Foster themselves acknowledge that  
120
 Part IV.C.2., infra, reconciles the least restrictive means and least stigmatic means theories of narrow tailoring.   
121
 Grutter at 330.   
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mass” of viewpoints and experiences was intended to break down.  Thus, Grutter’s narrow 
tailoring principles aim to reduce stereotyping within the admissions process, by minimizing 
stigmatic harm and requiring that applicants be reviewed on an individual basis.  This is why 
Grutter mandates that race be used in a flexible, rather than a mechanical, manner.  Even though 
race conscious policies can be employed, it is paramount that they not treat all applicants of the 
same racial group in exactly the same manner.
122
  Grutter’s other narrow tailoring requirements, 
including its “sunset” requirement,123 also aim to reduce and eventually eliminate stigmatic 
harm. 
When viewed together, “critical mass” and the least stigmatic means principle of narrow 
tailoring represent Grutter’s balance between the educational benefits of diversity and the 
stigmatic harm of race conscious policies.
124
  In fact, if properly implemented, Grutter’s narrow 
tailoring provisions inherently facilitate the admission of a “critical mass” of perspectives and 
experiences within racial groups.  Unlike a racial quota, numerical goal/range, or a Gratz-type 
point system, a “critical mass” cannot be attained merely by identifying an applicant’s race and 
mechanically using this information.  A holistic admissions process—which includes 
individualized review, considers race in a flexible manner, and uses diversity factors other than 
race—is necessary to yield a “critical mass” that includes diversity within racial groups.  By 
definition, achieving such within-group diversity reduces stigmatic harm, because it requires 
admissions committees to consider factors besides race and to treat applicants of the same race 
                                                          
122
 See supra Part II.B. 
123
 Grutter at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. … [i]n the context of higher 
education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and 
periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”). 
124
 See Adams, supra note 97 at 1953 (noting that “the balancing performed by Justice O'Connor in the Grutter case 
is as an example of cost-benefit balancing between societal harms and societal benefits.”); Rubenfeld, supra note 
113, at 438 (noting that strict scrutiny in recent equal protection jurisprudence can be viewed as  “a cost-benefit 
justificatory test … [which] … serve[s] to determine whether a law that causes acknowledged constitutional harms 
is justified by sufficiently important benefits that a less constitutionally costly … law could not have achieved.”). 
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differently based on non-racial factors.
125
  These were precisely the concerns expressed in Justice 
Kennedy’s Grutter dissent.126  
D.  Standards of Review in Grutter: The Need for Deference to Universities 
 Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter also contends that the Grutter majority abandoned 
strict scrutiny
127
 and critiques the majority for its deference to the Law School.
128
  The Grutter 
opinion does delineate multiple standards of review, deferring to universities’ “good faith” that 
racial diversity is necessary to attain educational benefits, while still applying strict scrutiny (the 
“least stigmatic means”) to evaluate the manner in which race is used (or at least claiming to do 
so).
129
  The “good faith” standard with respect to the educational benefits of diversity is a natural 
consequence of the analysis presented earlier: because “critical mass” is a complex entity and 
                                                          
125
 Grutter at 309 (“The Law School's admissions program …  is flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is 
evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes race or ethnicity the defining feature of the application.  … 
The Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment. There is no policy, 
either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft” variable. … Also, the 
program adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside 
race.”).  See also Gratz at 271 (noting that “Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke emphasized the importance of 
considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing all of the qualities that individual possesses, and in 
turn, evaluating that individual's ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education.”). 
For an example of how the Supreme Court envisioned this would work, see Gratz at 272-73 (“[I]nstructive 
in our consideration … is the example … which Justice Powell both discussed in, and attached to, his opinion in 
Bakke.  The example was included to “illustrate the kind of significance attached to race” … It provided  as follows: 
“The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find  itself forced to choose between 
A, the child of a successful black physician in an academic community with promise of superior academic 
performance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose  academic 
achievement was lower but who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently abiding 
interest in black power.   If a good number of black students much like A but few like B had already been 
admitted, the Committee might prefer B;  and vice versa.   If C, a white student  with extraordinary artistic 
talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique quality might give him an edge over both 
A and B. Thus, the critical criteria are often individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but 
sometimes associated with it.” 
126
 Grutter at 392-93(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as 
one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity …”).  Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter stemmed 
from his belief, based on the facts, that the University of Michigan School of Law did use race as a predominant 
factor.  Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting that at the University of Michigan School of Law, “race is likely 
outcome determinative for many members of minority groups.”).  He further noted that “an educational institution 
must ensure, through sufficient procedures, that each applicant receives individual consideration and that race does 
not become a predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.”  Id. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).   
127
 Id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(contending that “[t]he Court … does not apply strict scrutiny” in Grutter.). 
128
 Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“ Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.”). 
129
 Id. at 326 (noting that the Court has “held that all racial classifications imposed by government ‘must be analyzed 
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’”).  But see supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text. 
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cannot be measured accurately by courts, universities are in the best position to determine the 
level and type of diversity needed to fulfill their educational missions.  Grutter also cites the 
Supreme Court’s “tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, 
within constitutionally prescribed limits[,]”130 particularly with respect to “complex educational 
judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university.”131  Thus, both 
pragmatic and doctrinal reasons exist for deferring to universities’ judgment on the educational 
benefits of diversity.   
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent takes strong issue with such deference, 
critiquing the majority for being “satisfied by the Law School's profession of its own good 
faith.”132   This aspect of Grutter is likely to be modified or overturned when the Supreme Court 
decides Fisher.  Part IV of this Article proposes a more nuanced, alternative interpretation of 
Grutter’s deference and judicial review provisions—one that addresses Justice Kennedy’s 
concerns as applied to Fisher. 
In sum, this Part has illustrate how “critical mass” and Grutter’s least stigmatic means 
theory of narrow tailoring encompass diversity within groups.  Within-group diversity is relevant 
to the constitutionality of race conscious admissions for several reasons: 1. Distinguishing 
“critical mass” from racial quotas and numerical goals; 2. Attaining the educational benefits of 
                                                          
130
 Id. at 328. 
131
 Id.  See also id. at 329 (“We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education 
and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a 
special niche in our constitutional tradition. … In announcing the principle  of student body diversity as a 
compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the 
First Amendment, of educational autonomy:  ‘The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to 
education includes the selection of its student body.’  Bakke, supra, at 312 … From this premise, Justice Powell 
reasoned that by claiming ‘the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the “robust 
exchange of ideas,”’ a university ‘seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its 
mission.’”); Bakke at 319 (Powell, J., concurring)(“ Universities … may make individualized decisions, in which 
ethnic background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate educational purpose. So long as the 
university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference in the 
academic process.”). 
132
 Grutter at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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diversity articulated in Grutter; and 3. Reducing the stigmatic harm of race conscious policies; 
and 4. Clarifying the need for courts’ deference to universities with respect to admissions 
policies  Moreover, as the analysis of Fisher in the subsequent Parts will illustrate, race 
conscious admissions policies may be used not only to increase numbers of minority students, 
but also specifically to target particular subgroups of minority students, in order to increase 
diversity within racial groups.   
 
III.  Fisher v. Texas, “Critical Mass,” and Deference to Universities 
 Part II illustrated the internal logic and theoretical coherence of Grutter’s various 
components.  This Part discusses the application of “critical mass” in Fisher v. Texas and the 
Fifth Circuit panel’s deference to UT in determining whether it had enrolled a “critical mass.”  It 
then presents a critique of the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher opinion on these bases, setting the stage for 
the proposed alternative method to decide Fisher.  
 A.  Overview 
 Fisher v. Texas
133
 is the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to clarify Grutter’s “critical 
mass” concept.134  In order to understand Fisher, it is necessary to briefly review the University 
of Texas’s changing undergraduate admissions policy and provide historical context for the 
case.
135
   
                                                          
133
 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011)(upholding the University of Texas at Austin’s race conscious undergraduate 
admissions policy). 
134
 In Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), the Court did consider and strike down race conscious assignment 
plans for public schools, but the definition of “critical mass” was not a factor in the Court’s decision.  In fact, the 
Court distinguished these assignment plans from the holistic admissions policy upheld in Grutter.  Id. at 704-5 (“In 
Grutter, the number of minority  students the school sought to admit was an undefined ‘meaningful number’ 
necessary to achieve a genuinely diverse student body …  and the Court concluded that the law school did not count 
back from its applicant pool to arrive at that number [.] … Here, in contrast, the schools worked backward to 
achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level 
of diversity that provides the purported benefits.   This is a fatal flaw under the Court's existing precedent.”). 
135
 Id. at 222-31 (5
th
 Cir. 2011) (describing the history of changes in the University of Texas at Austin undergraduate 
admissions policy). 
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  1.  Hopwood v. Texas and the Top Ten Percent Law 
Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s 1996 decision in Hopwood v. Texas,136 the University of Texas 
(UT) used a variety of race conscious admissions procedures, and in Fall 1993, these resulted in 
an entering freshman class that was 4.5% African American and 15.6% Latina/o.
137
  In 1996, 
Hopwood outlawed the use of race conscious policies in the Fifth Circuit (Texas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi), and as a result, for Fall 1997, the African American enrollment in the incoming 
class dropped to 2.7% and the Latina/o enrollment dropped to 12.6%.
138
  In response, the Texas 
legislature passed the Top Ten Percent Law,
139
 which guaranteed admission to any Texas state 
university to Texas public high school seniors in the top ten percent of their class.
140
  This law 
was intended to increase minority representation without directly using race as part of the 
admissions process.
141
  By 2004, partly as a result of the Top Ten Percent Law, the percentage of 
African Americans in the incoming class had increased to 4.5% and the percentage of Latina/os 
increased to 16.9%.
142
   
 2.  Post-Grutter Return of Race Conscious Admissions 
 With the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter, Hopwood was overturned, and race 
conscious admissions policies, in accordance with Grutter’s principles, were once again 
permissible in Texas to enroll a “critical mass” of underrepresented minority students.  UT 
conducted a series of studies to determine whether it was enrolling a “critical mass” and 
concluded that it was not.  One study found that of classes with 10 to 24 students at UT, 89% had 
                                                          
136
 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
137
 Fisher at 223. 
138
 Id. at 224. 
139
 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803.  In 2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended “to cap the number of students 
guaranteed admission at UT Austin to 75% of the seats available to Texas residents.”  Fisher at 224 n.56. 
140
Fisher at 224. 
141
 Id. (“The Top Ten Percent Law did not by its terms admit students on the basis of race, but underrepresented 
minorities were its announced target and their admission a large, if not primary, purpose.”). 
142
 Id. Part of  his increase may have been due to demographic changes in the state of Texas. Id. at 226. 
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0-1 African American students, 41% had 0-1 Asian American students, and 37% had 0-1 
Latina/o students.  Another study which surveyed undergraduate students found that a majority 
felt that there was “insufficient minority representation” for the “full benefits of diversity to 
occur,”143 and that minority students reported feeling isolated.144 
 In response, the UT created a new, multifaceted admissions policy which significantly 
increased the enrollment of African American and Latina/o students, and also of Asian American 
students in the next few years.
145
  The vast majority of African American and Latina/o students 
were admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law, which was still in effect, as were over 80% of 
total admitted students to the University of Texas.
146
  The rest of the class was admitted on the 
basis of two measures: 1. Academic Index – a formula that predicts first year GPA based on high 
school class rank and standardized test scores;
147
 and 2. Personal Achievement Index (PAI) – 
based on holistic evaluation of an applicant’s entire file, including essays and a personal 
achievement score which factors in extracurricular activities, family and socioeconomic 
background, academic achievement as related to these variables, and race.
148
   
 The PAI is a numerical score based on ratings by admissions staff members, but 
consistent with the Gratz/Grutter framework, it does not attach a specific weight to race in the 
application process.
149
  The PAI was the only “race conscious” element of the new UT 
admissions plan.   
                                                          
143
 Id. at 225. 
144
 Id. 
145
 Id. at 226.  it is possible that some of these increases were due in part to demographic changes in the state of 
Texas.  Id. 
146
 Id. at 229.  In 2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended “to cap the number of students guaranteed admission 
at UT Austin to 75% of the seats available to Texas residents.”  Id. at 224 n.56. 
147
 Id. at 222. 
148
 Id. at 227-28. 
149
 Id. at 228.  Also noteworthy is the fact that any applicant, of any race, could benefit from UT’s race conscious 
admissions policy: 
race can enhance the personal achievement score of a student from any racial background, including whites 
and Asian-Americans. For example, a white student who has demonstrated substantial community 
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  3.  Plaintiffs’ Claim 
 Plaintiffs
150
 Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz were both denied admission to the 
University of Texas for the entering class of Fall 2008 and filed suit, alleging that UT’s race 
conscious admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs 
claimed that the race conscious aspects of the UT admissions policy was unwarranted because a 
“race neutral” policy, the Top Ten Percent Law, had already yielded a “critical mass” of Black 
and Latina/o students without the additional race conscious measure (the Personal Achievement 
Index).
151
  Thus, the issue in Fisher is different than that in Bakke,
152
 Hopwood,
153
 Gratz,
154
 and 
Grutter.
155
  All of those earlier cases were brought by Plaintiffs who claimed that their grades 
and standardized test scores would have almost certainly garnered them admission if they had 
been a member of a designated racial/ethnic group (usually Black or Latina/o).  The Plaintiffs in 
Fisher, in contrast, did not argue that UT would have admitted them but for the race conscious 
policy.
156
  Rather, they contended that UT had achieved sufficient diversity—a “critical mass” of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
involvement at a predominantly Hispanic high school may contribute a unique perspective that produces a 
greater personal achievement score than a similarly situated Hispanic student from the same school.   This 
possibility is the point of Grutter's holistic and individualized assessments, which must be " 'flexible 
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each 
applicant.'  Indeed, just as in  Grutter, UT applicants of every race may submit supplemental information to 
highlight their potential diversity contributions, which allows students who are diverse in unconventional 
ways to describe their unique attributes. Id. at 236. 
150
 This Article will refer to the parties who brought Fisher as the “Plaintiffs,” although the Fisher opinion 
sometimes refers to them as “Appellants” or “Plaintiff-Appellants.”  For purposes of this Article, these terms are 
interchangeable. 
151
 631 F.3d 213 (5
th
 Cir. 2011). 
152
 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
153
 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
154
 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
155
 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
156
 See Brown-Nagin, supra note 7, at 115 (“Fisher does not claim that racial consideration … necessarily doomed 
her prospects.  No evidence supports that position.  The record shows that a total of 216 black and Latino applicants 
gained acceptance to UT through holistic review in 2008, when Fisher unsuccessfully applied to UT.  The plaintiff 
concedes that race played no role in the admission of 183 of those 216 students … [t]he record is inconclusive on 
whether [the remaining] thirty-three black and Latino students benefitted from race.”). 
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underrepresented minority students—through its race neutral Top Ten Percent Law.157  
Consequently, given Grutter’s preference for race neutral alternatives, the Plaintiffs argued that 
UT could not use a race conscious admissions plan.
158
  
4.  Fifth Circuit Ruling in Fisher  
 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, in a ruling by Judge Sam 
Sparks, rejected the Plaintiffs’ arguments and granted summary judgment to UT.159  A three 
judge panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling and elaborated upon several of the issues 
presented.  The Fifth Circuit majority opinion in Fisher, by Judge Patrick Higginbotham, framed 
Grutter as “holding that diversity, including seeking a critical mass of minority students, is ‘a 
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.’”160  The Fifth 
Circuit panel rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that UT’s admissions policy amounts to racial 
balancing because it focuses on demographically underrepresented groups.
161
  The panel noted 
that demographics were only considered in assessing the initial need for a race conscious policy, 
not during the actual admissions process.
162
  Applying a “good faith” standard,163 the panel also 
deferred to UT’s judgment that race conscious policies were still necessary to attain a “critical 
mass” and actualize the educational benefits of diversity.  Judge Higginbotham’s opinion, along 
with the concurrence by Judge Emilio Garza, both found that UT’s admissions policy was 
consistent with Grutter, although in dicta, Judge Garza expounded upon his disdain for 
                                                          
157
 Fisher at 234 (noting that Plaintiffs “question whether UT needs a Grutter-like policy… [because] … UT's 
minority enrollment under the Top Ten Percent Law already surpassed critical mass … .”). 
158
 See id. (“[Plaintiffs] do not allege that UT's race-conscious admissions policy is functionally different from, or 
gives greater consideration to race than, the policy upheld in Grutter.  Rather, [Plaintiffs] question whether UT 
needs a Grutter-like policy.”). 
159
 556 F.Supp.2d 603 (W.D.Tex. 2008). 
160
 Fisher at 219. 
161
 Id. at 235-36. 
162
 Id. at 236. 
163
 Id. at 233 (“[S]o long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and not as part of a 
quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the university's good faith determination 
that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, including 
attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.”). 
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Grutter.
164
  Also in dicta, Judge Higginbotham was very critical of the Top Ten Percent Law, 
stating that it excluded well qualified minority students who attended more competitive high 
schools, and that it threatened to make UT’s race conscious policies unnecessary and 
unconstitutional.
165
 
In June 2011, by a narrow vote of 9 to 7, the Fifth Circuit denied the Plaintiffs request for 
a rehearing of Fisher en banc.
166
  Chief Judge Edith Jones authored a dissenting opinion, joined 
by four other judges.
167
  Chief Judge Jones’s critiques of Judge Higginbotham’s Fisher opinion 
were threefold.  First, Chief Judge Jones contended that Fisher essentially abrogates strict 
scrutiny by replacing Grutter’s narrow tailoring inquiry with a “good faith” standard.168  
Additionally, Judge Jones’s dissent found that the minimal impact of UT’s race conscious 
policy—the fact that over 80 percent of students are admitted through the race neutral Top Ten 
Percent plan—calls into question whether the race conscious policy is necessary to attain the 
educational benefits of diversity.
169
  Finally, Chief Judge Jones contended that the application of 
“critical mass” at the classroom level “offers no stopping point for racial preferences.”170  Under 
                                                          
164
 Id. at 247(Garza, J., specially concurring)(stating that “Grutter represents a digression in the course of 
constitutional law.”). 
165
 See infra Part III.B.3. 
166
 Fisher v. Texas, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011)(en banc denied). 
167
 Id. at 303 (Jones, C.J., dissenting). 
168
 Chief Judge Jones contended that the court “may presume a university's good faith in the decision that it has a 
compelling interest in achieving racial and other student diversity. But that is as about as far as deference should 
go.”  Id. at 305 n.3.   
169
 For a counterargument to Chief Judge Jones’s contention here, see infra Part V.C.2 (arguing that a race conscious 
admissions policy could be useful in attaining within-group diversity even if it only affects small numbers of 
students, because it is the novel and diverse perspectives those students bring, not their small numbers, that ties the 
race conscious policies to the educational benefits of diversity).  In fact, race conscious policies with a smaller 
impact are preferable because they create less stigmatic harm.  Moreover, as institutions gradually phase out race 
conscious policies in accordance with Grutter’s sunset requirement, one should expect a gradual reduction in their 
impact.  See infra Part V.C.3. 
170
 644 F.3d  at 307.  See also Brown-Nagin, supra note 7, at 126 (noting that some Justices “might find the 
appellant’s pleas for an upper limit on critical mass—a ceiling and a firm end point—appealing.  Without some 
concrete foundation for critical mass, Texas’s pursuit of the right mix of underrepresented students arguably is 
limitless and would permit consideration of race in perpetuity [.]”).  The “ceiling” and the “end point” here are 
actually different concepts, and the term “stopping point” in Chief Judge Jones’ dissent could have two different 
meanings: 1. The “ceiling”: A limiting principle on the weight of race in the admissions process.  This is discussed 
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Fisher, a college or university could use lack of representation of minorities in any class or major 
as justification for a race conscious policy, and this emphasis on diversity at the classroom level 
“offers no serious ground for judicial review of a terminus of the racial preference policy.”171 
The Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
after several delays,
172
 the Court granted on February 21, 2012.   The question presented in 
Fisher is: 
Whether this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), 
permit the University of Texas at Austin’s use of race in undergraduate 
admissions decisions.
173
 
 
The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Fisher on October 10, 2012, and the Court’s 
ruling should occur in early 2013. 
 B.  “Critical Mass” as Applied in Fisher 
 
 Fisher v. Texas represents the first post-Grutter litigation on affirmative action in higher 
education to apply the “critical mass” concept.  The arguments in Fisher with respect to “critical 
mass” focused mainly on numbers and percentages of minority students.   While the Fifth 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
infra in Part V.B.; or 2. The “end point”: the termination of race conscious policies altogether, in accordance with 
Grutter’s preference for race neutral policies and its “sunset” provision.  Part V.C.3 infra discusses how race 
preferences can be gradually phased out. 
171
 644 F.3d  at 307.   
172
 On September 15, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.  See 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher, http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Fisher-petiton-
aff.-action.pdf.
 
  UT did not file a response brief, and the Supreme Court requested a response from UT by 
November 30, 2011, later extending that deadline until December 7, 2011.  See Lyle Denniston, Affirmative Action 
Case Develops, November 1, 2011, http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/affirmative-action-case-develops/.  UT 
then filed its response, arguing against certiorari largely on inappropriate vehicle grounds.  See Brief in Opposition 
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher, (No. 11-345).  Available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Fisher.BIO.Final.12.7.2011.pdf.  The Court was first scheduled to consider the cert 
petition in conference on January 13, 2012, and then deferred consideration to its January 20 conference, and then 
again until the February 17 conference, before finally granting certiorari.  See 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm. 
173
 Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (2011)(en banc denied), cert. granted (February 21, 2012)(No. 11-345), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-00345qp.pdf 
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Circuit’s opinion espoused a more comprehensive definition of “critical mass,” its analysis was 
also based largely on numbers.   
  1.  Plaintiffs’ View of “Critical Mass” 
The Fisher Plaintiffs’ analysis of “critical mass” focused solely on campus-wide numbers 
of minority students.  They argued that 21.4% minority (Black and Latina/o) enrollment at UT 
was a sufficient “critical mass,” noting that in Grutter, the University of Michigan School of 
Law only attained 13.5% to 20.1% minority enrollment in the years preceding the lawsuit.
174
  
The Plaintiffs argued that “the concept of critical mass is defined as ‘a sufficient number of 
underrepresented minority students such that such minority students would ‘not feel isolated or 
like spokespersons for their race.’”175  The Fifth Circuit panel purported to reject this view and 
was clear in noting that “critical mass” did not refer to “any fixed number.”   
 2.  UT and Fifth Circuit Panel’s View of “Critical Mass” 
The University of Texas had described “critical mass” in more abstract terms such as 
“meaningful representation”; however, the University’s argument also centered on numbers.  UT 
argued that: 1. The Plaintiffs improperly combined African Americans and Latina/os for 
purposes of assessing “critical mass”;176  and 2. In any case, “critical mass” had not been attained 
within the student body or at the “classroom level.”177 
                                                          
174
 Id. at 243.  The Plaintiffs also argued “that minority enrollment at UT now exceeds the level it had reached in the 
mid-1990s, pre- Hopwood, when the University was free to obtain any critical mass it wanted through overtly race-
based decisions.”  Id. at 244. 
175
 Br. Pl.s-Appellants 6, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Plaintiffs.5th.Circuit.Brief.pdf.  See also Fisher 
at 243 (noting that the Plaintiffs contend that “the concept of critical mass is defined by the minimum threshold for 
minority students to have their ideas represented in class discussions and not to feel isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race.”).   
176
 Brief of Appellees at 46, Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-50822), Available at: 
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Fisher.v.St.o.Tx-Appellees.Brief.pdf  (“Plaintiffs … commit the fatal 
error of combining two different groups of underrepresented minorities in order to determine critical mass.”). 
177
 See id. at 48-49 (arguing that UT’s classroom study “provides a dramatic illustration of the absence of diversity 
on campus at UT prior to 2005 … [and] … only further dramatized … that UT lacked sufficient diversity, including 
a critical mass of minority students, across the entire student body …”).  
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To support this argument, UT noted that a large percentage of its seminar classes, with 
10-24 students, had only 0 or 1 Black, Latino, and/or Asian American students.
178
  These small 
classes are presumably the classroom settings where racial stereotypes could be broken down 
and cross racial understanding could be fostered, and unless there are at least two students of any 
group, there cannot be diverse perspectives represented from that group.  In that sense, diversity 
within racial groups was implicit in UT’s concept of “critical mass,” although not stated 
directly.
179
 
UT’s response may have been a simple legal strategy for the lower court case, as it 
directly refuted the Plaintiff’s claims in the clearest and simplest manner possible, and it 
provided a more nuanced view of “critical mass.”  Nevertheless, it did not fully articulate how 
within-group diversity has its own benefits and relates to the “critical mass” concept,180 and it did 
not clearly distinguish “critical mass” from numerical goals at the classroom level.181  Part V 
                                                          
178
 See Fisher at 225 (According to[UT’s study of classroom diversity], 90% of these smaller classes in Fall 2002 
had either one or zero African-American students, 46% had one or zero Asian-American students, and 43% had one 
or zero Hispanic students.”)(internal citations omitted).  Presumably, UT omitted the smallest classes—those with 
less than 10 students—because they would be statistically unlikely to have more than 0 or 1 students from various 
minority groups even if the numbers of minority students increased significantly. 
179
 Judge Sam Sparks’s district court opinion in Fisher also suggests this point.  See 645 F.Supp.2d 587, 602-3 
(W.D.Tex., 2009).  (“Critical mass, which is an adequate representation of minority students to assure educational 
benefits deriving from diversity, affects in a positive way all students because they learn that there is not ‘one’ 
minority or majority view. … [T]here is a compelling educational interest for the University not to have large 
numbers of classes in which there are no students-or only a single student-of a given underrepresented race or 
ethnicity.”). 
180
 In its brief to the Supreme Court, UT does note that “[p]etitioner completely overlooks the diversity within racial 
groups that UT’s holistic plan fosters.”  Brief of Respondents at 20, Fisher v. Texas, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued 
October 10, 2012).  Available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Brief%20for%20Respondents.pdf.   
UT’s Supreme Court brief also asserts that “[h]olistic review permits the consideration of diversity within racial 
groups.”  Id. at 33.  However, UT does not elaborate upon this idea or analyze it in depth, as this Article does.  
Additionally, the amicus brief for the Society of American Law Teachers, supporting UT and citing a draft of this 
Article, notes that Black and Latino students admitted under UT’s race conscious policy “could contribute to 
diversity in various ways.”  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Society of American Law Teachers in Support of 
Respondents at 23,  Fisher v. Texas, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued October 10, 2012).  Available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/11-
345%20bsac%20Society%20of%20American%20Law%20Teachers.pdf  
181
 UT argued that it “[d]id [n]ot [a]rticulate a [r]igid, [n]umerical [d]efinition of [c]ritical [m]ass. Br. Pl.s-
Appellants at 34, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Plaintiffs.5th.Circuit.Brief.pdf.  However, while its 
definition may not have been “rigid,” UT did not show how “critical mass” could be defined in any terms other 
numerical goals or ranges.  See also infra Part III.D.1.   
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infra will discuss some other ways in which the goal of attaining diversity within racial groups 
might be used to justify a race conscious admissions policy. 
Judge Higginbotham’s Fisher opinion noted that the Supreme Court in Grutter was 
divided over the meaning of “critical mass,” but it cited Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion, 
which defined “critical mass” through “reference to the educational benefits that diversity is 
designed to produce.”182  The Fifth Circuit panel defined these benefits in broad terms: 1. 
“Increased Perspectives” - those brought by diverse groups of students into the classroom, which 
add valuable knowledge and make for engaging classroom discussions; 2. “Professionalism” – 
preparing students for “work and citizenship” by exposing them to diverse people and 
viewpoints; and 3. “Civic Engagement” – creating paths to leadership for individuals of every 
race and ethnicity.
183
  However, the Fifth Circuit did not apply this definition further; it merely 
adopted UT’s view of “critical mass” at the classroom level. 
 3.  Judge Higginbotham’s Analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law 
Beyond the ruling in Fisher, Judge Higginbotham’s analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law 
illustrates the need to understand “critical mass” in terms of within-group diversity.   The other 
Fifth Circuit panel judges did not join this part of Judge Higginbotham’s opinion, which stated 
that the Top Ten Percent Law “threatens to erode the foundations UT relies on to justify 
implementing Grutter polices . . .  .”184  Judge Higginbotham noted that the Top Ten Percent 
Law did lead to an increase in minority enrollment, and that by 2008, 81% of incoming in-state 
students at UT were admitted via the Top Ten Percent Law.
185
  As a consequence, the opinion 
contended that the Top Ten Percent Law precluded UT from admitting minority students who 
                                                          
182
 Fisher at 219.   
183
 Id. at 219-220.  The Fifth Circuit panel also did not discuss the breakdown of racial stereotypes in classrooms, 
which was the specific educational benefit that Grutter cited at the classroom level.  See supra notes 45-48 and 
accompanying text, and infra Part III.D.2. 
184
 Id. at 242. 
185
 Id. at 227. 
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went to more competitive schools but did not finish in the top 10 percent of their graduating 
classes, and who could contribute to diversity in various ways.
186
   Judge Higginbotham referred 
to the Top Ten Percent Law as “a polar opposite of the holistic focus upon individuals” which 
was sanctioned by Grutter, and noted that “its internal proxies for race end-run the Supreme 
Court’s studied structure for use of race in university admissions decisions.”187   Further, he 
opined:  
  the University does not respond to the reality that the Top Ten Percent Law  
  eliminated the consideration of test scores, and correspondingly reduced academic 
  selectivity, to produce increased enrollment of minorities.  Such costs may be  
  intrinsic to affirmative action plans.  If so, Grutter at least sought to minimize  
  those costs through narrow tailoring.  The Top Ten Percent Law is anything but  
  narrow.
188
 
 
Thus, in spite of ruling in favor of the University, Judge Higginbotham also concluded that 
“[a]ppellants are correct that the decision to [enact the Top Ten Percent Law] … places at risk 
UT’s race-conscious admissions policies.”189  Part III.D.4. presents a critique of Judge 
Higginbotham’s analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law’s effect on the constitutionality of race 
conscious policies. 
C.  Deference to Universities in Fisher 
The issue of deference to universities on determining whether they had enrolled a 
“critical mass” of minority students was a contentious point in the Fifth Circuit’s Fisher opinion, 
and it will be a major issue when the Supreme Court considers the case.  The question is 
essentially what standard of review courts should apply when evaluating whether it is necessary 
for a university to use race conscious admissions policies to attain the educational benefits of 
                                                          
186
 Id.  Unlike Judge Higginbotham, this Article argues that Grutter allows race conscious policies to be used 
specifically to target the minority students noted here.  See infra Part V.A.2. 
187
Id. at 242. 
188
Id. at 242. 
189
 Id. at 243. 
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diversity.  In the Fisher litigation itself, the two standards debated were “strong basis in 
evidence”190 and “good faith.”191     
1.  Plaintiffs’ View of Deference 
To determine whether a university needed to use race conscious admissions policies to 
attain the educational benefits of diversity, the Fisher Plaintiffs argued that the Fifth Circuit 
should adopt a “strong basis in evidence” standard, comparable to that used to evaluate the 
necessity of remedial race conscious policies in “public employment and government contracting 
cases.”192  This standard would place a significantly higher burden on universities than the “good 
faith” standard suggested in Grutter.193  The Fifth Circuit panel rejected this argument.194   
                                                          
190
 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009)(noting that “in the context of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment …[t]he Court has held that certain government actions to remedy past racial 
discrimination—actions that are themselves based on race—are constitutional only where there is a “ ‘strong basis in 
evidence’ ” that the remedial actions were necessary.”)(internal citations omitted); See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
of Educ. 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)(noting that “the trial court must make a factual determination that the employer 
had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)(noting that City of Richmond did not provide a “strong basis in evidence for 
its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”)(internal quotation omitted). 
191
 See Grutter at 343 (“We take the Law School at its word that it would "like nothing better than to 
find a race-neutral admissions formula" and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as 
practicable.   See … Bakke, supra, at 317-318, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.) (presuming good faith of 
university officials in the absence of a showing to the contrary).”).  Justice Kennedy and Chief Judge Jones 
discussed the issue of deference in terms of strict scrutiny, and Part IV infra considers how strict scrutiny relates to 
deference. 
192
 See Fisher at 232.  (“Appellants urge that Grutter did not extend such deference to a university's decision to 
implement a race-conscious admissions policy.   Instead, they maintain  Grutter deferred only to the university's 
judgment that diversity would have educational benefits, not to the assessment of whether the university has attained 
critical mass of a racial group or whether race-conscious efforts are necessary to achieve that end. … Appellants 
would have us borrow a more restrictive standard of review … in which the Supreme Court ‘held that certain 
government actions to remedy past racial discrimination-actions that are themselves based on race-are constitutional 
only where there is a 'strong basis in evidence' that the remedial actions were necessary.’”).  See also supra note 190 
(discussing the “strong basis in evidence” standard). 
193
 See supra notes 68 and 191. 
194
 Fisher at 233 (“The high standard for justifying the use of race in public employment decisions responds to the 
reality that race used in a backward-looking attempt to remedy past wrongs, without focus on individual victims, 
does not treat race as part of a holistic consideration. In doing so, it touches the third rail of racial quotas. “).  The 
Fisher panel also cited Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 noting that “[w]hen 
scrutinizing two school districts' race-conscious busing plans, the Court invoked Grutter's “serious, good faith 
consideration” standard, rather than the strong-basis-in-evidence standard that Appellants would have us apply. .. 
The Parents Involved Court never suggested that the school districts would be required to prove their plans were 
meticulously supported by some particular quantum of specific evidence. Rather, the Court struck down the school 
districts' programs because they pursued racial balancing and defined students based on racial group classifications, 
not on individual circumstances.”  Fisher at 233-34 (internal citations omitted).  See also Parents Involved at 704-
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 2.  UT and Fifth Circuit Panel’s View of Deference 
UT argued for a “good faith” standard to assess the need for race conscious admissions 
policies,
195
 citing Grutter’s deference to universities in choosing their student bodies.196  As 
noted earlier,
197
  the Fifth Circuit panel adopted this view,
198
 which was heavily criticized by 
Chief Judge Jones in her dissent to the en banc denial.
199
 
D.  Critiquing Fisher’s Approach to “Critical Mass” and Deference 
 There are several critiques of the application of “critical mass” and deference to 
universities in Fisher, including those noted by Chief Judge Jones in her dissent.
200
  Because the 
two issues are intricately linked in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis,201 this Section considers them 
together.   
1.  Focus on Numbers and Percentages 
In spite of the Fifth Circuit panel’s elaborate articulation of diversity-related objectives in 
Fisher, and its claim that “critical mass” should be defined in terms of the educational benefits of 
diversity, rather than by numbers,
202
 the panel’s analysis focused largely on numbers.  It adopted 
UT’s notion of “critical mass” at the classroom level, but it did not articulate any theory that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5(noting that “[working] backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from 
some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits … is a fatal flaw under the Court's 
existing precedent.”)(internal citations omitted). 
195
 See Appellee’s Br. At 25-26, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Fisher.v.St.o.Tx-Appellees.Brief.pdf 
(noting that given “a university’s unique First Amendment rights … universities are entitled to ‘a degree of 
deference’ and a ‘presumption of good faith’—‘absent a showing to the contrary’ … [c]ourts must therefore‘defer’ 
to the considered judgment of admissions officials—and must not interfere with their admissions policies and 
decisions—unless the officials have acted unreasonably or in bad faith.”). 
196
 Grutter at 328-29. 
197
 See supra Part III.A.4. 
198
 Fisher at 233 (“Grutter teaches that so long  as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized 
manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the 
university's good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational 
benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.”).   
199
 See supra note 168. 
200
 See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text. 
201
 Essentially, the Fifth Circuit deferred to UT not only the need for race conscious admissions policies, but also on 
the meaning of “critical mass.”    
202
 See supra notes 57 and 182-183 and accompanying text. 
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would allow Fisher to be decided on a basis other than whether a particular number or 
percentage of minority students were present at the classroom level.  One might argue that 
because it did not adopt any fixed number as a “critical mass,” Fisher is not in conflict with 
Bakke’s proscription of numerical goals.203  However, by its very conclusion that the numbers of 
minority students in UT’s participatory size classes did not constitute a “critical mass,” the Fifth 
Circuit’s Fisher opinion implies that some number or percentage—perhaps having at least two 
Black, Latino, and Asian American students in every class—would constitute a “critical mass.”  
If this is the case, then that number or percentage effectively becomes a numerical goal.
204
  
Fisher then runs dangerously close to Justice Kennedy’s concern that “critical mass is … used … 
to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”205  And if there is no such theoretical 
goal, then Chief Judge Jones’s critique206 that Fisher offers no meaningful ground for judicial 
review is valid.
207
   
2.  Incomplete Consideration of the Educational Benefits of Diversity 
As noted, Fisher discussed “critical mass” in terms of “the educational benefits that 
diversity is designed to produce,”208  and the Fifth Circuit stated these as: “Increased 
Perspectives,” “Professionalism, ”and “Civic Engagement.”209  The Grutter majority opinion 
was more nuanced, specifically linking “critical mass” to the breakdown of racial stereotypes 
through classroom discussions—by exposing students to a “variety of viewpoints” within each 
                                                          
203
 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
204
 See supra notes 37 and 54 and accompanying text.  Professor Brown-Nagin notes that “UT’s reliance on state 
population figures and classroom- and program-level racial diversity numbers as critical mass metrics is likely to 
elicit strong objection[]” and offers a “an alternative critical mass benchmark: the proportion of underrepresented 
senior high school students in Texas whom UT deems viable candidates for admission.”).  Brown-Nagin, supra note 
7, at 118.  This Article contends that any numerical benchmark for “critical mass” is likely to elicit objection from 
Justice Kennedy as a violation of Bakke and Grutter’s proscription on quotas and numerical goals.  See supra note 
30.  See also supra Part I.A. for a general critique of numerical “critical mass” benchmarks. 
205
 Grutter at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
206
 See supra notes 170-171  and accompanying text. 
207
 See infra Part III.D.3. 
208
 Fisher at 219. 
209
 Id. at 219-220. 
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group.
210
  While it also discussed broad societal benefits, such as producing a diverse 
representation of leaders, the Grutter majority delineated the classroom functions of “critical 
mass” more directly than Fisher, and implicit in those functions was a notion of “critical mass” 
that included diversity within racial groups.
211
 
This omission in Fisher is important because the breakdown of racial stereotypes is key 
to understanding why “critical mass” must include diversity within racial groups, and why 
consideration of such within-group diversity is important in applying Grutter’s principles.212 
 3.  Problematic Analysis of the Top Ten Percent Law 
Judge Higginbotham opined (not joined by the other members of the three judge panel) 
that the Top Ten Percent Law, by increasing the number of Black and Latino students, raises 
questions about the need for further race conscious policies.
213
  As noted earlier, mere numbers 
of minority students do not speak to the constitutionality of a race conscious policy.  Grutter 
dictated that such policies are necessary to attain diversity within racial groups and break down 
racial stereotypes, not to attain any particular number of minority students.
214
   
                                                          
210
 Grutter at 319-20. (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes 
lose their force because nonminority students learn there is no "minority viewpoint" but rather a variety of 
viewpoints among minority students.).   
211
 See id. at 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on ‘any belief that minority students 
always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’ … To the contrary, 
diminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School's mission, and one that it cannot 
accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.”).  See also id. at 330. ([T]he Law School's concept of 
critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce. … These 
benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law School's admissions policy promotes “cross-
racial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better understand persons of 
different races.).   
212
 See supra Parts I.C. and II.  As noted earlier, UT did allude to diversity within racial groups in its Supreme Court 
brief.  See supra note 180.  UT also noted the breakdown of racial stereotypes in its Supreme Court brief.  See infra 
note 277. 
213
 Fisher at 243. (“Appellants are correct that the decision to [enact the Top Ten Percent Law] … places at risk 
UT’s race-conscious admissions policies.”). This Article does not endorse or critique the Top Ten Percent Law as a 
policy.  Rather, it just contends that Judge Higginbotham’s assertion that the Top Ten Percent Law “places at risk” 
UT’s race conscious policy is erroneous. 
214
 See supra Part I.C. 
Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups  54 
 
Moreover, as the Fisher panel itself recognized, minority students admitted under the Top 
Ten Percent Law disproportionately enroll in certain schools and majors, and are 
underrepresented in other majors.
215
  Earlier in the opinion, Judge Higginbotham’s conclusion 
stated precisely why UT’s race conscious policy is justified in addition to the Top Ten Percent 
Law:  
It is evident that if UT is to have diverse interactions, it needs more minority 
students who are interested in and meet the requirements for a greater variety of 
colleges, not more students disproportionately enrolled in certain programs.   The 
holistic review endorsed by Grutter gives UT that discretion …216 
 
Essentially, the principle espoused here is that UT’s race conscious policy is constitutionally 
justifiable to attain within-group diversity among minority students, which yields the educational 
benefits noted in Grutter.
217
  Judge Higginbotham’s statement that the Top Ten Percent Law 
“places at risk UT’s race-conscious admissions policies”218 merely obscures this point and is off 
base.  This also illustrates the need for a coherent, well-articulated theory of “critical mass” that 
explicitly includes within-group diversity.
219
 
Additionally, in the UT admissions system, the Top Ten Percent Law serves largely to 
admit Black and Latina/o students from segregated public schools.
220
  UT could justify its race 
                                                          
215
 Fisher at 240 (“While the [Top Ten Percent Law] may have contributed to an increase in overall minority 
enrollment, those minority students remain clustered in certain programs, limiting the beneficial effects of 
educational diversity.FN147  For example, nearly a quarter of the undergraduate students in UT's College of Social 
Work are Hispanic, and more than 10% are African-American.   In the College of Education, 22.4% of students are 
Hispanic and 10.1% are African-American.   By contrast, in theCollege of Business Administration, only 14.5% of 
the students are Hispanic and 3.4% are African-American.”). 
216
 Fisher at 240. 
217
 See Parts I.C. and II.C.  In its Supreme Court brief, UT makes a similar point.  See supra notes 180 and 277 and 
accompanying text. 
218
 Fisher at 243. 
219
 See supra Part I.C. 
220
 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)(“Percentage plans depend for 
their effectiveness on continued racial segregation at the secondary school level:  They can ensure significant 
minority enrollment in universities only if the majority-minority high school population is large enough to guarantee 
that, in many schools, most of the students in the top 10% or 20% are minorities.   Moreover, because such plans 
link college admission to a single criterion-high school class rank-they create perverse incentives.   They encourage 
parents to keep their children in low-performing segregated schools, and discourage students from taking 
challenging classes that might lower their grade point averages.”); Jennifer L. Shea, Percentage Plans: An 
Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups  55 
 
conscious policy on grounds of within-group socioeconomic and demographic diversity—to 
admit Black and Latina/o students from predominantly White schools in more affluent 
districts.
221
  Not only would these students be more competitive academically,
222
 but consistent 
with Grutter’s mandate, they would add diverse perspectives and experiences within the Black 
and Latina/o student populations on campus.  One common stereotype of Black and Latino 
students is that all students from these groups come from poor, inner city backgrounds.  If UT’s 
race conscious policy did indeed target the noted population, then it serves directly to break 
down this racial stereotype, and thus to help attain the educational benefits of diversity noted in 
Grutter.
223
  Moreover, the race conscious policy also adds to the overall diversity of viewpoints 
on campus, as Black and Latina/o students from more competitive, predominantly White schools 
have different experiences and perspectives than their counterparts who gain admission through 
the Top Ten Percent Law.   
While there are many possible critiques of the Top Ten Percent Law,
224
 it does not 
automatically impact the constitutionality of UT’s race conscious admissions policy merely 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Inadequate Substitute for Affirmative Action In Higher Education Admissions, Note, 78 Ind. L.J. 587, 615 
(2003)(“In Texas, one critic of the Texas Plan remarked that the ‘very success [of the percentage plan] to produce a 
diverse student body depends on continuing the de facto segregation of Texas high schools.’”). 
221
 At the Fifth Circuit, UT did not use this defense, focusing instead on “critical mass” at the classroom level.  IT 
did, however, raise the a similar point in its Supreme Court brief.  See infra note 277. 
222
 The Fifth Circuit panel acknowledged this point.  See Fisher at 240 (“[T]he Top Ten Percent Law hurts academic 
selectivity:  UT must admit a top ten percent student from a low-performing high school before admitting a more 
qualified minority student who ranks just below the top ten percent at a highly competitive high school.”). 
223
 Grutter at 319-20 (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes 
lose their force because nonminority students learn there is no  'minority viewpoint'  but rather a variety of 
viewpoints among minority students.”).  UT raised this point in its Supreme Court brief.  See infra note 277.  
Another possible reason to have a mix of minority students from high and low socioeconomic backgrounds is that 
the former, who have often attended predominantly White schools in affluent districts or elite, private schools, may 
help the latter adjust to elite, predominantly White universities.  This argument was raised by Shanta Driver, a 
lawyer for the student intervenors in Grutter, at a debate on affirmative action shortly after the Supreme Court’s 
Grutter ruling.  Social science studies can investigate whether such an effect does indeed occur and bolster any 
arguments for within-group diversity by UT and other institutions. 
224
 See, e.g., supra note 220. 
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because it increases the number of minority students.
225
  As long as UT’s race conscious policy 
contributes to diversity in a unique manner, by admitting Black and Latina/o students from 
different backgrounds and with different viewpoints than those admitted via the Top Ten Percent 
Law, there is no problem with its constitutionality.  Nevertheless, Part V elaborates further on 
how courts can evaluate the contribution of a race conscious admissions policy, while also 
applying strict scrutiny rather than the “good faith” standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit panel in 
Fisher. 
4.  The Question of Different Racial Groups 
There is another potential problem that can arise if courts try to determine whether an 
institution has attained a “critical mass”: what if a race conscious policy is necessary for some 
groups but not others?  Fisher only dealt with numbers and percentages of Black and Latina/o 
students, and the Fifth Circuit seemed to assume that if Black and Latina/o students had been 
sufficiently represented, then the use of race would have been deemed entirely unconstitutional.  
However, this position does not take into account Native Americans and other groups.  Even if 
there were sufficient numbers (and sufficient within-group diversity) for Black and Latina/o 
students, UT could still potentially have justified its race conscious policy for the purpose of 
admitting greater numbers of Native American students, or any other racial/ethnic group that is 
underrepresented.
 226
  Moreover, even if the number of Native American students admitted via 
                                                          
225
 This Article does argue that the Top Ten Percent Law or any other race neutral policy which contributes 
significantly to racial diversity may allow more stringent review of a co-existing race conscious admissions policy.  
See infra Part IV.C.2.  However, it would still be erroneous to say that the race neutral policy automatically puts the 
race conscious policy in danger; that would only be true if the race conscious policy did not uniquely contribute to 
diversity above and beyond the race neutral policy.  See infra Parts IV.C.2 and V.C.1. 
226
 UT’s policy did not grant ex ante preference to any particular group.  See supra note 149.  However, it can be 
presumed, given the University’s arguments, that its race conscious policy primarily targeted Black and Latino 
students.  Between 2007 and 2010, UT enrolled no more than 26 Native American students in any year, and in 2010 
the number was only 13.  See Report 13: Implementation and Results of the Texas Automatic Admissions Law (HB 
588) at the University of Texas at Austin 8, Office of Admissions at the University of Texas at Austin, 
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588-Report13.pdf 
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the race conscious policy were very small, these students may still add different perspectives and 
contribute to the educational benefits of diversity.   
Although not raised in Fisher, this example raises some problems with assessing “critical 
mass” that could occur in another case.  Unlike a point system (e.g., the policy rejected in Gratz), 
race conscious policies in a holistic admissions system are not group specific.  Many different 
groups could contribute to the “critical mass” of perspectives that actualizes the educational 
benefits of diversity.  Using demographic data from one or two groups to determine the 
constitutionality of an entire race conscious policy is problematic, as the policy could affect 
enrollment of other groups that may still be underrepresented.  It is quite possible that at least 
some Native American students were admitted under UT’s race conscious admissions policy; 
yet, neither the parties nor the Fifth Circuit addressed the impact on these students if the race 
conscious policy is struck down.  
5.  No Meaningful Standard for Judicial Review 
As noted earlier in Part III.D.1, the Fisher panel’s treatment of “critical mass” was 
indistinguishable from a numerical goal.  Moreover, even if there is no such theoretical goal 
implicit in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of “critical mass,” and even if there were no problem with 
defining “critical mass” in terms of numbers, Chief Justice Jones’s criticism that the Fisher 
opinion offers no meaningful ground for judicial review is valid.
227
  The Fisher opinion did not 
provide any indication regarding what would constitute a “critical mass” at the classroom level 
or how a court would review whether this goal had been attained; it merely deferred to UT.   The 
panel noted that “[i]f a plaintiff produces evidence that calls into question a university’s good 
faith pursuit of those educational benefits [that diversity is designed to produce], its race-
                                                          
227
 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups  58 
 
conscious admissions policies may be found unconstitutional.”228   However, it held that there 
was “insufficient reason to doubt UT’s good faith conclusion that ‘the University still has not 
reached a critical mass at the classroom level.’”229  Regardless of whether this was a valid 
result,
230
 it leads one to ask: 1. What would be necessary, beyond the evidence presented by the 
Fisher Plaintiffs, to create sufficient doubt? and 2. If there was such doubt, how would a court 
evaluate whether the race conscious policy was, in fact, constitutional?
231
  These questions are 
particularly important given Justice Kennedy’s concerns about deference to universities in his 
Grutter dissent.
232
  The next two Parts take up these questions. 
 
IV.  Three Categories for Review: Implementation vs. Educational Objective vs. Need 
 
As noted earlier, the appropriate standard of review—the level of deference given to 
universities—was an issue of contention in Fisher.233  Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s Grutter 
dissent distinguished between two categories of deference to universities, as he contended that 
the Grutter majority “confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational objective 
with deference to the implementation of this goal.”234  An analysis of Grutter and Fisher together 
suggests that there are three separate categories of review when examining deference to 
universities: 1. Review of the actual implementation of race conscious policies as implemented 
to insure they comply with Grutter’s requirements, which requires strict scrutiny; 2.  Review of 
whether the university’s educational objective encompasses racial diversity (essentially, whether 
                                                          
228
 Id. at 245. 
229
Id. at 244. 
230
 This Article does not take a position on the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Fisher; it focuses on providing an alternative 
basis for analyzing the case. 
231
 Part IV provides this Article’s proposed answers to these questions. 
232
 Grutter at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting that “courts … [should] apply a searching standard to race-based 
admissions schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives … 
[rather than]   … be satisfied by … profession of its … “good faith …”). 
233
 See supra Part III.C. 
234
 Grutter at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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the university has a compelling interest in diversity), which requires only “good faith” on the part 
of the university; and 3.  Review of whether race conscious admissions policies are needed to 
attain this educational objective, which is the source of controversy in Fisher.
235
  After 
delineating these three categories, this Part will focus on the last one.  Justice Kennedy’s view of 
this specific issue—how courts should review whether a university needs to use race conscious 
policies to attain its educational objective—will be key to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Fisher. 
A.  Review of the Implementation of a Race Conscious Policy – Strict Scrutiny 
 
The standard of review for race conscious policies as implemented is strict scrutiny: such 
policies must adhere to Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles.  The Grutter majority,236 the Fisher 
three judge panel,
237
 Chief Judge Jones’s dissent to the Fisher en banc denial,238 and Justice 
Kennedy’s Grutter dissent239 all agree here.  As noted earlier, there are commentators who argue 
that Grutter’s narrow tailoring test does not equate with traditional notions of strict scrutiny,240 
and Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent contended that the Grutter majority did not actually apply 
strict scrutiny when assessing the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy.241  
Nevertheless, in theory, there is agreement that strict scrutiny should be the standard of review 
for the implementation of a race conscious admissions policy. 
 
 
                                                          
235
 See Br. Pl.s-Appellants at 43, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Plaintiffs.5th.Circuit.Brief.pdf (“The 
only dispute with regard to narrow tailoring … is whether UT has demonstrated a valid need for its policy.”). 
236
 Grutter at 308 (“All government racial classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 
scrutiny.”). 
237
 Fisher at 231 (“It is a given that as UT's  Grutter-like admissions program differentiates between applicants on 
the basis of race, it is subject to strict scrutiny with its requirement of narrow tailoring …”). 
238
 644 F.3d at 305 (Jones, C.J., dissenting)(“[T]he Court[‘s] … many holdings … have applied conventional strict 
scrutiny analysis to all racial classifications.”). 
239
 Grutter at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“This Court has reaffirmed, subsequent to Bakke, the absolute 
necessity of strict scrutiny when the State uses race as an operative category.”). 
240
 See Ayres and Foster, supra note 82. 
241
 Grutter at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The Court … [in Grutter] … does not apply strict scrutiny.”); Id. at 390 
(“The majority fails to confront the reality of how the Law School's admissions policy is implemented.”). 
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B.  Review of a University’s Educational Objective – “Good Faith” 
The standard of review for a university’s educational objective—whether a university has 
a compelling interest, given its educational goals and mission, in pursuing racial diversity—is  
“good faith.”  The Grutter majority,242 the Fisher three judge panel,243  Chief Judge Jones’s 
dissent to the Fisher en banc denial,
244
 and Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent245 all agree here 
also.  Courts can presume on good faith that a university has a compelling interest in the 
educational benefits of racial diversity and that the university’s goals and mission encompass this 
interest.
246
 
C.  Review of the Need for Race Conscious Policy to Achieve a University’s  
     Educational Objective: The Question in Fisher 
 
The standard of review for whether race conscious policies are needed to attain a 
university’s educational objective (i.e., its compelling interest in racial diversity) is a key issue as 
the Supreme Court considers Fisher.  The substantive question is whether race conscious policies 
are needed to attain the educational benefits of diversity, given that a race neutral policy (the Top 
Ten Percent Law) has increased racial diversity.  Is the standard of review a deferential, “good 
faith” standard—as it is for whether the university has a compelling interest in racial diversity 
itself—or is the question of need subject to strict scrutiny, as the implementation of race 
                                                          
242
 Id. at 343 (“We take the Law School at its word … [and] … presume[e] good faith of university officials …”). 
243
 Fisher, 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir.2011)( “[S]o long as a university considers race in a holistic and 
individualized manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to 
the university's good faith …”). 
244
 Fisher at 644 F.3d 301, 305 n.3 (5th Cir. 2011)(Jones, C.J., dissenting)(en banc denied) (noting that a court “may 
presume a university's good faith in the decision that it has a compelling interest in achieving racial and other 
student diversity. But that is as about as far as deference should go.”). 
245
 See Grutter at 388(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting that “[i]n the context of university admissions the objective of 
racial diversity can be accepted … but deference is not given with respect to the methods by which it is pursued.”).  
Justice Kennedy’s language here suggests that he applies a deferential standard to reviewing a university’s 
educational goals and compelling interest in seeking racial diversity. 
246
 See also Bakke at 319 n.53 (Powell, J., concurring)(“Universities … may make individualized decisions, in 
which ethnic background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate educational purpose. So long 
as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference in the 
academic process.”). 
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conscious policies is?
247
  The level of judicial review with respect to need was a major point of 
disagreement between the Fisher three judge panel and Chief Judge Jones.
248
  In her dissent to 
the denial of the Fisher en banc hearing, Chief Judge Jones was extremely critical of the Fifth 
Circuit panel’s deference to UT with respect to the need for race conscious policies; she claimed 
that such deference leaves no place for meaningful judicial review.
249
  Chief Judge Jones stated 
that the Fisher three judge panel abrogated strict scrutiny by replacing Grutter’s narrow tailoring 
inquiry with a “good faith” standard,250  and contended that the “good faith” standard applied to 
a university’s compelling interest in diversity, not to the need for race conscious policies to attain 
this diversity.
251
  Further, Chief Judge Jones criticized the Fisher panel  for its conclusion that:  
so long as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized manner, and 
not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of 
deference to the university's good faith determination that certain race-conscious 
measures are necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity, including 
attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.
252
  
 
Chief Judge Jones contended that “this statement apparently conflates the University's 
compelling interest with narrow tailoring, or at least it misleads as to the importance of each 
prong of strict scrutiny analysis.”253   
A close reading of Grutter suggests otherwise: “The Court takes the Law School at its 
word that it would like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula and will 
                                                          
247
 The Fisher Plaintiffs advocated a “strong basis in evidence” standard to evaluate the need for race conscious 
admissions policies.  See supra notes 190 and 192 and accompanying text.  The Fisher three judge panel rejected 
this standard.  See supra note 194.   
248
 See supra Part III.A.4. 
249
 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
250
 See Fisher v. Texas, 644 F.3d 301, 305 (5th Cir. 2011)(Jones, C.J., dissenting)(en banc denied)(“The Fisher 
panel opinion … supplants strict scrutiny with total deference to University administrators.”)(footnote omitted). 
251
 Id. at 305 n.3. (noting that a court “may presume a university's good faith in the decision that it has a compelling 
interest in achieving racial and other student diversity. But that is as about as far as deference should go.”). 
252
 Fisher, 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir.2011). 
253
 Id.   
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terminate its use of racial preferences as soon as practicable.”254  This language implies that the 
Supreme Court in Grutter gave “good faith” deference to the University of Michigan Law 
School with respect to the need for race conscious admissions policies.  The Fisher three judge 
panel also interpreted Grutter in this way.
255
   
Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court decides Fisher, Grutter’s “good faith” deference 
may well not survive.  As noted, Justice Kennedy was quite critical of this deference;
256
 it was 
his chief reason for dissenting in Grutter.
257
   Although his Grutter dissent addressed 
“educational objective” and “implementation” rather than need for race conscious policies,258  it 
is likely that Justice Kennedy will apply a higher standard of review to assessing need than the 
Fifth Circuit panel did. 
However, there is another method to examine this issue which is consistent with Grutter.  
The distinction between ex ante and ex post deference is significant, in terms of the practicability 
of judicial review.  Ex ante here refers to assessing the need for race conscious policies before a 
race neutral strategy has been tried and proven effective in increasing diversity.  Ex post, on the 
other hand, refers to the need for such policies after a race neutral policy (such as the Top Ten 
Percent Law) has been implemented and proven successful in increasing racial diversity: this is 
                                                          
254
 Grutter at 309-10.  This language—specifically “at its word”—implies that the Supreme Court in Grutter gave 
“good faith” deference to the University of Michigan Law School in determining the necessity of its race conscious 
policies. 
255
 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
256
 Grutter at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting that “[d]eference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent 
with it[,’” and criticizing Grutter majority for being “willing to be satisfied by the Law School's profession of its 
own good faith.”).   
257
 See id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“If the Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the 
use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority to approve the use of race in pursuit of student 
diversity.”).   
258
 See id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its 
educational objective with deference to implementation …”).  Kennedy’s dissent here addresses the university 
educational objective and the “implementation” of its race conscious policies, but not assessment of the need for 
race conscious policies. 
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the case in Fisher.  This Article argues that ex post, it is more practical to apply a higher standard 
of review and give less deference to universities. 
1.  Ex ante Review with Respect to Need: “Good Faith” 
It would be very difficult for a court to assess, ex ante, whether any viable race neutral 
alternative exists for enrolling a “critical mass” and attaining the educational benefits of 
diversity.  First, there are numerous potential admissions policies that might increase diversity in 
one way or another, and Grutter stated that a university need not exhaust all race neutral 
alternatives.
259
  Second, as argued earlier, “critical mass” cannot be measured readily,260 and it 
would be difficult to devise judicial standards to determine whether a university has attained a 
“critical mass” and the accompanying educational benefits of diversity.  This is why Grutter 
deferred to the “good faith” of universities on the issue of whether race neutral admissions 
policies can adequately replace race conscious ones.
261
   
One could thus interpret Grutter as applying “good faith” deference to universities ex 
ante on the need for race conscious admissions policies.  However, Fisher fits into the ex post 
category, because a race neutral policy—the Top Ten Percent Law—is already in place at UT.   
 2.  Ex post Review with Respect to Need: Strict Scrutiny 
The ex post analysis—after a race neutral policy has been implemented, as is the case in 
Fisher—is different.  Here, a more stringent level of judicial review is practical and consistent 
                                                          
259
 Grutter at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”).  
Of course, Fisher could change this standard. 
260
 See supra Part I.C.3. 
261
 It may be possible for a Plaintiff to provide evidence, ex ante, that a race neutral policy could be as effective as a 
race conscious one in producing diversity.  To take a hypothetical example, a Plaintiff (or an advocacy organization 
representing an appropriate Plaintiff) might conduct a study and show that if the University of Michigan 
implemented a policy similar to Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law, then it could attain the same level of diversity as it 
does with race conscious policies.  If that study was presented as evidence, it might warrant less deference; the 
University of Michigan would have to rebut the evidence or show how its race conscious policy contributed 
uniquely to diversity.   
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with Grutter.
262
  A court need not just consider the possibilities: it can instead assess the efficacy 
of the implemented race neutral policy and compare it to the race conscious policy being 
challenged.  This can create a meaningful standard by which courts can review the need for race 
conscious admissions policies.
263
  If an institution has already implemented a race neutral policy 
to increase diversity, then a Plaintiff can make the argument that such a policy has yielded 
sufficient diversity.  The Fisher Plaintiffs did this, by comparing percentages of Black and 
Latino students admitted prior to Hopwood and under the Top Ten Percent Law, and also by 
comparing UT’s minority enrollment percentages with those of the University of Michigan Law 
School at the time of Grutter.
264
   
UT rebutted this claim by showing that diversity at the classroom level was insufficient.   
However, the Fifth Circuit did not require UT to demonstrate that its race conscious policy was 
the least restrictive means for attaining sufficient diversity at the classroom level.  The panel’s 
analysis did lay out why the Top Ten Percent Law did not yield sufficient diversity—because it 
disproportionately admitted minority students in certain majors
265
--but the panel did not require 
UT to show that its race conscious admissions policy explicitly aimed to admit students who 
were not admitted through the Top Ten Percent Law.  The panel rejected any standard higher 
than “good faith” for reviewing UT’s decision to implement a race conscious admissions 
policy.
266
   
                                                          
262
 Grutter did not make the ex ante/ex post distinction and thus did not address ex post review at all. 
263
 Courts can also review Plaintiffs’ claims that race neutral policies would generate sufficient diversity, if those 
claims are supported by sufficient evidence, such as empirical data.  See infra Parts V.A. and V.C.1. 
264
 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
265
 See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text. 
266
 Fisher at 233 (“Grutter teaches that so long  as a university considers race in a holistic and individualized 
manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-point system, courts must afford a measure of deference to the 
university's good faith determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary to achieve the educational 
benefits of diversity, including attaining critical mass in minority enrollment.”).  The Plaintiffs in Fisher had argued 
for a higher standard of review.  See supra notes 190 and 192 and accompanying text.  
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Nevertheless, a more stringent standard is certainly possible and practical.  As noted in 
Part II.B.2, Professors Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster argue that Grutter deviates from the 
traditional least restrictive means standard of narrow tailoring.
267
  Their critique centered broadly 
on Grutter’s narrow tailoring requirements, but can also apply to the Fifth Circuit’s review of the 
need for UT’s race conscious admissions policy in Fisher.268  This Article argues that Grutter is 
consistent with a higher level of scrutiny ex post, for a race conscious policy implemented after a 
race neutral policy has increased diversity.
269
  The Fifth Circuit could have required UT to 
demonstrate that its race conscious policy actually made a unique contribution to diversity, 
beyond that obtained through the Top Ten Percent Law.  If courts are going to enforce Grutter’s 
preference for race neutral alternatives over race conscious admissions policies,
270
 a higher 
standard than “good faith” would be necessary.  The standard proposed is a goals-means fit 
which is considered the hallmark of strict scrutiny.
271
   
Consistent with Justice Kennedy’s view,272 the next Part proposes and lays out the 
“unique contribution to diversity” test, which focuses on diversity within racial groups as a 
compelling interest and also employs strict scrutiny as the standard for reviewing the need for 
race conscious policies to attain this interest.   
 
 
 
                                                          
267
 Ayres and Foster, supra note 82. 
268
 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
269
 See supra notes 262-266 and accompanying text. 
270
 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 
271
 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
272
 See Grutter at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its 
educational objective with deference to implementation of this goal.  In the context of university admissions the 
objective of racial diversity can be accepted … but deference is not to be given with respect to the methods by which 
it is pursued.”). 
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V.  Unique Contribution to Diversity: Applying Strict Scrutiny in Fisher 
This Part presents an approach to Fisher that is less deferential to universities than the 
Fifth Circuit opinion and applies strict scrutiny: the “unique contribution to diversity” test.  The 
purpose of this test is to assess the underlying issue raised by Fisher—whether a race conscious 
policy is necessary to attain the educational benefits of diversity when a race neutral policy is in 
place and has increased diversity.  The “unique contribution to diversity” test builds upon the 
earlier analysis of diversity within racial groups and “critical mass,” but it does not require a 
court to determine whether a “critical mass” of minority students is present, or to define “critical 
mass” precisely in any specific numerical or other terms.  Rather than attempting to determine 
whether a “critical mass” is present, the test focuses on whether the race conscious policy 
contributes uniquely to the educational benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter.   
 A.  Assessing Unique Contribution to Diversity Instead of “Critical Mass” 
Building on the analysis of standard of review and the general discussion of within-group 
diversity, this Article argues that a court could decide Fisher by assessing whether a race 
conscious admissions policy makes a unique, meaningful contribution to the educational benefits 
of diversity articulated in Grutter, rather than trying to determine whether a “critical mass” of 
minority students is present at the classroom or campus level.
273
  For example, in Fisher, after 
                                                          
273
 The unique contribution to diversity test articulated here could work for the Top Ten Percent Law or for other 
race neutral admissions policies that aim to increase diversity.  Other race neutral policies that might increase 
diversity include consideration of applicants’ socioeconomic background, first generation college status, “marked 
residential instability” (defined in terms of moving from residence to residence frequently while growing up), 
geographic residency, enrollment in low-performing schools, a guaranteed percentile admission plan (i.e., Top Ten 
Percent Law), and admissions preference to all students (regardless of the race) at a school based on the school’s 
socioeconomic or racial composition.   See “Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity in 
Postsecondary Education,” http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/guidancepost.pdf  at 7 (discussing 
Obama administration’s recommendations for implementation of race conscious admissions policies and race 
neutral alternatives in higher education).  The “Guidance” presumes these policies are “race neutral.”  But see supra 
note 15.   Additionally, the “Guidance” recommends that institutions document their compelling interests and unique 
educational missions and make records of race neutral alternatives that are considered, along with the reasons for 
rejecting those alternatives.  See “Guidance” at 7. 
 
Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups  67 
 
the Plaintiffs presented evidence that UT had obtained sufficient diversity via the race neutral 
Top Ten Percent Law, UT would have to articulate how its race conscious policy adds to the 
educational benefits beyond the Top Ten Percent Law, and in a manner not practical via the Top 
Ten Percent Law.  UT could do this in at least two different ways: 
  1.  Unique Contribution to Representation of Different Racial Groups 
 Although it was not addressed in Fisher, if UT was employing its race conscious policy 
to admit more Native American students or any other underrepresented minority group, then that 
would show that the policy is making a unique contribution to the educational benefits of 
diversity.  UT would also have to show that the Top Ten Percent Law did not admit sufficient 
numbers of Native American students.  This argument was not raised in Fisher, as both the 
Plaintiff and UT focused on Black and Latina/o students; nevertheless, the argument could be 
relevant in another case with similar facts. 
   2.  Unique Contribution to Diversity Within Racial Groups 
UT could also show that its race conscious policy contributed to diversity within racial 
groups, consistent with the educational benefits of within-group diversity and the notion of 
“critical mass” advocated in this Article.  It could have argued that its race conscious policy was 
needed to attain more Black and Latino students in certain majors,
274
 and presented evidence that 
the policy was actually used to admit students in those majors.
275
  UT did in fact submit evidence 
conveying the disparate enrollment of minority students in certain majors, although its argument 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
274
 The advantage of an individualized, holistic race conscious policy is that it does allow student majors and 
academic interests to be considered in admissions, and an admissions committee can target those majors that are 
underrepresented.  This would be more difficult with a non-individualized process, such as the Top Ten Percent 
Law.  See Fisher at 240 (“While the [Top Ten Percent] Law may have contributed to an increase in overall minority 
enrollment, those minority students remain clustered in certain programs …”). 
275
 One possible confound here is that many students switch majors after enrolling in college.  UT might also have to 
show that a significant percentage of students admitted on this basis actually remained in the given majors, so that 
classroom benefits of diversity are actualized. 
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focused solely on numbers at the classroom level and did not convey the educational benefits of 
within-group diversity.  Moreover, the Fifth Circuit did not predicate its ruling in Fisher on any 
such showing of evidence, applying a deferential “good faith” standard instead.276 
Alternatively, UT could have demonstrated that its race conscious policy contributed to 
socioeconomic, cultural, or geographic diversity among Black and Latino students.
277
  This 
would also show that the race conscious policy made a unique contribution to diversity—perhaps 
by facilitating the admission of Black and Latino students with different experiences and 
perspectives than students admitted through the Top Ten Percent Law.   If the policy allowed 
enrollment of Black and Latino students from more competitive, affluent, predominantly White 
schools, then it would contribute to such within-group diversity and thus to the educational 
benefits of diversity espoused in Grutter.
278
  UT would also have to show that the Top Ten 
Percent Law did not admit significant numbers of these students.   
UT could also demonstrate that its race conscious policy contributed to within-group 
diversity in some other unique way.
279
  So long as the educational benefits of diversity obtained 
                                                          
276
 See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
277
 This issue was not raised in Fisher at the district court or in the Fifth Circuit argument.  However, in its Supreme 
Court brief, UT did assert that Black and Latino students admitted under its race conscious policy “have great 
potential for serving as a ‘bridge’ in promoting cross racial understanding, as well as in breaking down racial 
stereotypes.”  Brief of Respondents at 34, Fisher v. Texas, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued October 10, 2012).  Available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Brief%20for%20Respondents.pdf.   Further, UT asserted “[p]etitioner’s 
position would forbid UT from considering … a [high-achieving, affluent Black or Latino] student’s race, even 
though admission of such a student could help dispel stereotypical assumptions (which actually may be reinforced 
by the top 10% plan) by increasing diversity within diversity.”  Id.(emphasis in original).   
278
 See supra Parts I.C. and II.C.  As noted earlier, one common stereotype of Black and Latino students is that all of 
these students come from poor, inner city backgrounds, and if UT’s race conscious policy does indeed target the 
noted population, then it serves directly to break down this racial stereotype, and thus to help attain the educational 
benefits of diversity noted in Grutter.  See supra note 223 and accompanying text.   
279
 For example, Professors Kevin Brown and Jeanine Bell advocate for universities to distinguish between different 
Black groups, such as Black immigrants (from Africa and the Caribbean), multiracial persons, Black Latinos, and 
African Americans, when implementing their race conscious admissions policies.  See Brown & Bell, supra note 8; 
Brown, supra note 8.  Additionally, the Pew Hispanic Center has published reports detailing diversity within 
Latina/o populations in the U.S.  See, e.g., Seth Motel & Eileen Patten, Hispanic Origin Profiles, June 27, 2012, 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/06/27/country-of-origin-profiles/  ( noting that “[t]here are differences across 
[Latina/o] groups in the share of each that is foreign born, holds citizenship (by birth or naturalization) and is 
proficient in English.  They are also of varying age, tend to live in different areas within the U.S. and have varying 
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by enrolling these students were consistent with those articulated in Grutter, and the group of 
students targeted could not readily be admitted in sufficient numbers via the Top Ten Percent 
Law or some other race neutral policy, the race conscious policy would be constitutional.  
 3.  What Would be the Result in Fisher? 
If the Supreme Court adopted the “unique contribution to diversity” test, it would vacate 
the Fifth Circuit ruling in Fisher, but it would not declare UT’s race conscious policy to be 
unconstitutional.  Rather, it would remand the case for review based on the more stringent 
standard proposed here.  The eventual result would be an open question, dependent on UT’s 
ability to demonstrate that its race conscious policy makes a unique contribution to diversity, 
above and beyond the Top Ten Percent Law.
280
  Consistent with strict scrutiny, UT’s race 
conscious policy would have to be narrowly tailored to fit the compelling interest of attaining 
within-group diversity and its educational benefits. 
B.  Limiting Principle on Race Conscious Policies to Attain Diversity 
One question left open by the “unique contribution to diversity” test is what is the 
limiting principle on race conscious policies to attain diversity?  The test itself does not place an 
upper limit on the use of race conscious admissions policies, because there are an infinite number 
of diverse viewpoints.  In theory, a university could always use race to admit students with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
levels of education, homeownership, income and poverty.”).   Similarly, the White House Initiative on Asian 
Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPI) has emphasized the significance of diversity within AAPI groups.  See 
Arelis Hernandez, Spreading the Word on Asian American Diversity, DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., June 23, 
2010, http://diverseeducation.com/article/13904c4/spreading-the-word-on-asian-american-diversity.html (“For 
Kiran Ahuja, the executive director of the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPI), 
communicating an accurate picture of Asian American diversity to policymakers across the federal government 
represents a fundamental task … [.]). 
280
 As noted earlier, UT does assert in its Supreme Court brief that its race conscious policy adds to diversity within 
racial groups.  See supra notes 180 and 277.  This Article argues, however, that UT must go beyond mere assertion 
and actually demonstrate that it uses race in a manner to actually attain within group diversity and its educational 
benefits. 
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different viewpoints, even if vast racial and within-group diversity already exists within the 
admitted class of students.  What then is the limiting principle for the use of race?
281
 
There are at least two possible answers to that question: 1. The point of diminishing 
return for the educational benefits of diversity; and 2. The overall, aggregate weight given to race 
in the admissions process.  Although both are generally consistent with Grutter, the latter makes 
more sense in light of the issues raised in this Article. 
 1.  Point of Diminishing Returns for the Educational Benefits of Diversity 
Inclusion of more diverse perspectives can always add to the educational experience.  
However, there are diminishing returns to educational benefits of diversity.  Given the time and 
space constraints, students cannot experience all perspectives and educational opportunities that 
might be available in classrooms and on campuses more generally.  As noted earlier in Part II, 
race conscious policies have costs.  At some point, the stigmatic harm and other costs associated 
with race conscious admissions policies begin to outweigh any additional benefits of diversity—
and one interpretation of Grutter is that beyond this point, it does not allow further consideration 
of race.
282
   
While this analysis is logically consistent with the theory of Grutter articulated in this 
Article, it runs into a practical problem.  It would be no easier for a court to determine the point 
of diminishing returns for the educational benefits of diversity than it would to determine if a 
“critical mass” is present;283 either determination is highly subjective and context dependent.   
                                                          
281
 See also City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989)(rejecting “race-based decisionmaking [that is] 
essentially limitless … .”). 
282
 Cf. Ayres & Foster, supra note 82 at 576-77 (arguing that courts should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of race 
conscious admission policies).  This Article does not contend that the Grutter majority itself viewed “critical mass” 
in terms of such a cost-benefit analysis.  Rather, the contention here is that the diversity/stigmatic harm calculus 
noted here can be inferred from Grutter’s narrow tailoring principles and its notion of “critical mass.”   
283
 In one sense, determining the point of “critical mass” is the same as determining the point of diminishing returns 
for the educational benefits of diversity.  When there is a “critical mass” present, enrolled through the type of 
admissions process that Grutter envisions, the educational benefits of diversity (racial and within-group) can 
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Moreover, Grutter has other provisions which may be more practical and may also create a lower 
bound for the use of race conscious policies—by limiting the weight that can be placed on race 
in the admissions process.   
2.  Aggregate Weight of Race in Admissions 
Regardless of the educational benefits of diversity, there may be an upper limit on race 
conscious admissions policies based on the total aggregate weight that can be given to race in the 
admissions process. Since Grutter mandates that race be used in a flexible, non-mechanical 
fashion, based on individualized review,
284
 there is no systematic weight of race for individual 
applicants in a constitutional, holistic admissions plan.  However, the weight of race in 
aggregate—for all applicants in a given admissions cycle—can be measured, 285 and this 
aggregate weight compared to a designated limit that is determined by courts.  Two provisions in 
Grutter suggest that there is such a limit.  First, the Grutter majority opinion notes that “[n]arrow 
tailoring … requires that a race-conscious admissions program not unduly harm members of any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
outweigh, by the greatest extent possible, the stigmatic harms, reinforcement of stereotypes, and other costs created 
by race conscious policies necessary to attain that diversity.  In this way, one can think of Grutter’s “critical mass” 
concept and narrow tailoring requirements as joint provisions to maximize the breakdown of racial stereotypes and 
promote cross-racial understanding—taking into account both the educational benefits of diversity and the costs of 
race conscious policies. 
284
 See supra Part II.B.1. 
285
 In Grutter, the Plaintiffs made an argument based on the aggregate weight of race in the admissions process.  The 
Grutter Plaintiffs used data on the undergraduate GPAs and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores of 
accepted and rejected applicants to the University of Michigan School from 1995 to 2000, all sorted by race, and 
calculated the odds of acceptance for members of each group.   Part of the basis for their argument was that after 
statistically controlling for academic criteria and other variables, Black, Latino, and Native American applicants had 
a much higher probability of being accepted to the Law School than White and Asian American applicants.  See 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821, 838 (E.D.Mich.,2001)(overruled 539 U.S. 306(2003))(Plaintiffs’ expert 
witness concluding that “that ‘[a]ll the graphs comparing Native American, African American, Mexican American, 
and Puerto Rican applicants to Caucasian American applicants show wide separation indicating a much higher 
probability of acceptance for the particular ethnic group at a given selection index value.’”).  But see Goodwin Liu, 
The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 Mich. L.Rev. 1045, 1049 
(2002) ((“In any admissions process where applicants greatly outnumber admittees, and where white applicants 
greatly outnumber minority applicants, substantial preferences for minority applicants will not significantly diminish 
the odds of admission facing white applicants.”) cited in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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racial group.”286  While this provision could be interpreted to limit the weight placed on race,287 
Grutter held that “in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity 
contributions of all applicants,” the [University of Michigan’s] Law School's race-conscious 
admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants.”288  If the Supreme Court 
follows this standard in Fisher, then undue burden will not be an issue: all parties concede that 
the weight given to race in UT undergraduate admissions is less than that upheld in Grutter for 
the University of Michigan Law School admissions program.
289
 
Second, and perhaps more important when Fisher goes before the Court and particularly 
Justice Kennedy, race cannot be the “predominant” factor in the admission of any applicants.  As 
Justice Kennedy stated in his Grutter dissent:  
There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest 
factor among many others to achieve diversity, but an educational institution must 
ensure … that race does not become a predominant factor in the admissions 
decisionmaking.
290
   
 
Nevertheless, while noting that a weight requirement could be read into Grutter’s individualized 
consideration requirement,
291
 Professors Ayres and Foster contend that “the Grutter Court failed 
                                                          
286
 Grutter at 341.   
287
 See Ayres and Foster; supra note 82, at 558 (contending that “evidence the Grutter Court viewed the weight 
inquiry to be part of the individualized consideration inquiry comes in its discussion of the requirement that the 
affirmative action plan not unduly burden third parties.”).   Ayres and Foster further note that “the no-undue-burden 
requirement …[is]…a requirement that is related to the weight given to race in admissions … .”  Id. 
288
 Grutter at 341.   
289
 See Appellee’s Br. At 18, http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Fisher.v.St.o.Tx-Appellees.Brief.pdf (noting 
that “UT’s consideration of race is even more modest than the policy upheld in Grutter.”).  See also Fisher, 645 F. 
Supp. 2d at 608 (District court opinion noting that UT considers race in its admissions process as a factor of a factor 
of a factor.”). 
290
 Grutter at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  See also supra Part I.C.1. (arguing that perhaps the University of 
Michigan Law School could not admit more Native American applicants without making race the predominant 
factor in admissions).   
291
 See Ayres and Foster, supra note 82, at 558.   
Vinay Harpalani - Diversity Within Racial Groups  73 
 
to offer a theory for where the line should be drawn between programs that weight race too 
heavily and those that do not.”292 
This Article agrees that the allowable weight given to race, in aggregate, needs to be 
clarified to provide a limiting principle for Grutter-like admissions plans.  A full consideration of 
the aggregate weight of race in a holistic admissions process is beyond the scope of this 
Article.
293
  Moreover, although the Supreme Court could address this issue if it revisits Grutter, 
it is not the immediate issue at play in Fisher itself.
294
  The purpose of the discussion here is just 
to show how an upper bound on the aggregate weight of race in an admissions process can be a 
limiting principle for the “unique contribution to diversity” test, and for race conscious 
admissions more generally.
295
 
C.  Advantages of a “Unique Contribution to Diversity” Test  
The “unique contribution to diversity” test described here has several advantages over a 
direct assessment of “critical mass.”  It directly addresses the critiques of the Grutter majority 
presented in Justice Kennedy’s dissent and the critiques of the Fisher panel opinion presented in 
Chief Judge Jones’s dissent,296 and it also helps to resolve other dilemmas faced by judges and 
advocates trying to interpret and apply Grutter.   
1.  Ground for Judicial Review and Application of Strict Scrutiny 
 
                                                          
292
 Id.  Judge Garza’s dissent in Fisher also contends that the weight of race preferences is a necessary element for 
meaningful judicial review.  See Fisher at 251 (Garza, J., specially concurring)(noting that in Grutter, “the weight 
given to race as part of this individualized consideration is purposefully left undefined, making meaningful judicial 
review all but impossible.”).  
293
 The Grutter Plaintiffs’ argument, supra note 285, provides some indication of how aggregate weight of race 
might be measured, notwithstanding Professor Liu’s critique, supra note 285. 
294
 All parties concede that the weight given to race in UT undergraduate admissions is less than that upheld in 
Grutter for the University of Michigan Law School admissions program.See supra note 289.   
295
 An upper bound on the aggregate weight of race could also be useful in gradually phasing out race conscious 
policies.  Plaintiffs in future cases could argue for reduction of the allowable upper bound, based on demographic 
changes, development of race neutral admissions strategies, or other developments that increase minority 
enrollment.  See infra Part V.C.3. 
296
 See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text. 
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The unique contribution to diversity test directly addresses Justice Kennedy’s concern, 
raised in his Grutter dissent, that:  
courts … apply a searching standard to race-based admissions schemes, that would force 
educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives … [rather than]   … 
be satisfied by … profession of its … “good faith.297   
 
It also quells Chief Judge Jones’s critique by offering “serious ground for judicial review of 
terminus of the racial preference policy.”298  The test articulated requires a precise fit between 
goals and means—characteristic of strict scrutiny. UT or another university could not just claim 
that underrepresentation of minorities in particular majors justifies its race conscious policy; it 
would have to show that the race conscious policy in question actually targets and admits 
minority students in those given majors. The same would be true if the university contended that 
the race conscious policy contributed to within-group socioeconomic or geographic diversity.
299
    
The proposal here balances various interests, giving universities freedom to pursue 
different admissions strategies which use race in accordance with Grutter’s provisions, while 
also holding them accountable to Grutter’s preference for race neutral admissions policies.  In 
doing so, it adopts standard of review similar in stringency to that advocated by the Fisher 
Plaintiffs.
300
   However, unlike the “strong basis in evidence” standard, which is a “backward-
looking attempt to remedy past wrongs,”301 the “unique contribution to diversity” test focuses on 
“working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported 
                                                          
297
 Grutter at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  See also id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(noting the “necessity for scrutiny 
that is real, not feigned, where the … category of race is a factor in decisionmaking.”). 
298
 Fisher v. Texas, 644 F.3d 301, 312 (5th Cir. 2011)(en banc denied).(Jones, C.J., dissenting). 
299
 Of course, students often change majors while in college, and this could provide a basis for counterargument.  
Socioeconomic and geographic diversity within racial groups are not malleable after admission in this way and thus 
might be more viable bases for race conscious policies. 
300
 See supra notes 190 and 192 and accompanying text.   
301
 Fisher at 233. 
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benefits.”302  The test applies strict scrutiny to review the need for race conscious policies to 
attain diversity, when a race neutral policy has been or could be effective in increasing diversity.  
It requires a university to demonstrate the utility of a race conscious policy if: 1. A race neutral 
policy is in place that significantly increases diversity; or 2. A plaintiff provides sufficient 
evidence that a race neutral policy would result in levels of diversity comparable to the race 
conscious policy in question.
303
  “Good faith” would apply only when there is not sufficient 
evidence presented to raise a question about the need for race conscious policies to attain the 
educational benefits of diversity.
304
  
Additionally, while the “unique contribution to diversity” test requires a goals-means fit 
for race conscious admissions policies, it does not place an overwhelming burden on universities 
to accomplish this end.  Institutions of higher education have or can readily obtain all of the data 
necessary to demonstrate how their race conscious policies contribute to the educational benefits 
of diversity.  Colleges and universities may need to collect more demographic data on diversity 
within racial groups, and also to structure their race conscious admissions policies more carefully 
to make sure those policies make a “unique contribution to diversity.”  However, there is no 
barrier that would prevent these institutions from readily doing so.
305
   
                                                          
302
 Parents Involved at 705. 
303
 Such evidence might be data that convincingly show how a race neutral policy would increase diversity at a 
particular institution.  The reason to allow such evidence to invoke more stringent review is to insure that 
universities have incentive to explore race neutral alternatives to their race conscious admissions policies—a 
particular concern of Justice Kennedy.  See Grutter at 394(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“Were the courts to apply a 
searching standard to race-based admissions schemes, that would force educational institutions to seriously explore 
race-neutral alternatives.”).  In the absence of convincing evidence, courts would accept universities’ “good faith” 
determination that race conscious policies are necessary, as dictated by Grutter. 
304
 In such a case, a court would only review if the race conscious policy conformed to Grutter’s narrow tailoring 
principles; it would presume “good faith” on the university’s part regarding the need for the race conscious policy. 
305
 These measures may cause institutions to incur more costs, but colleges and universities have adjusted to similar 
circumstances in the past: after Grutter, institutions had to expend more resources on holistic admissions and 
eliminate more cost effective point systems similar to the one struck down in Gratz.  See Gratz at 275 
(“Respondents contend that ‘[t]he volume of applications and the presentation of applicant information make it 
impractical for [LSA] to use the ... admissions system’ upheld by the Court today in  Grutter. … But the fact that the 
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2.  Assessing the Unique (Even if Minimal) Impact of Race Conscious    
     Policies 
 
The “unique contribution to diversity” test also addresses Chief Judge Jones’s contention 
that the race conscious policy has a minimal impact;
306
 in fact, the test focuses on whether the 
race conscious policy does have a meaningful, unique impact.  It is possible that a race conscious 
policy that admits only a small number of minority students can have a meaningful, unique 
impact, if those students add to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences in a manner beyond 
the race neutral policy.
307
  The admission of even small numbers of Black and Latina/o students 
from certain majors, or from more competitive schools, would be justifiable if minority students 
in those majors were not admitted sufficiently via the Top Ten Percent Law, as would the 
admission of small numbers of Native American students via a race conscious admissions policy.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
implementation of a  program capable of providing individualized consideration might present administrative 
challenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.”).(internal citation omitted). 
306
 See text accompanying supra note 169.    
307
 In its Supreme Court brief, UT also argued that “[t]he nuanced and modest impact of race under UT’s holistic 
review plan is … a constitutional virtue, not a vice.”  Brief of Respondents at 36, Fisher v. Texas, No. 11-345 (U.S. 
argued October 10, 2012).  Available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Brief%20for%20Respondents.pdf.  But see Ayres and Foster, supra note 
81, at 523 n.27 (“At least as a theoretical matter, narrow tailoring requires not only that preferences not be too large, 
but also that they not be too small so as to fail to achieve the goals of the relevant compelling government interest.”).  
This contention does not apply to race conscious admissions policies in higher education for two reasons: 1. Even a 
small increase in diversity could have meaningful educational benefits: having one or two students from a given 
racial group may be significantly better than having none—particularly if those students are vocal in class or active 
on campus.  In his Constitutional Law course at NYU Law, Professor Derrick Bell jokingly referred to Turquoise 
Young, a Black female student who always voiced her opinions, as a “critical mass of one.”  Professor Bell noted 
that in some of his classes, one or two vocal students had a tremendous impact on class discussions—although he 
acknowledged that this did not always happen.  The variable and unpredictable nature of classroom dynamics is 
another reason why “critical mass” is difficult to measure.  See supra Part I.C.3.    2. As a practical matter, in a 
holistic admissions system that is in compliance with Grutter (i.e., which uses race a flexible, unquantified plus 
factor), such minimal use of race would be difficult to detect.  Cf. Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New 
Racial Preferences, 96 CAL L. REV. 1139, 1142 (2008)(raising “the question of whether race can in fact be 
eliminated from admissions processes.”); Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institutionalization of 
Affirmative Action as Diversity Management At UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, And UW-Madison, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 
985, 1015 (2007)(noting that “the line between race-based and race-blind policy making can be quite blurry.”).  
There is no way to completely eliminate race from a holistic admissions process, as information about an applicant’s 
race may be present throughout the application—via personal statements, student group membership, and even 
names which are correlated with group membership.  In a “race neutral” legal regime, Plaintiffs might be able to 
prove significant use of race with statistics, but they would have a very difficult time proving or even detecting 
minimal usage.   
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 3.  Proper Application of Grutter’s “Sunset” Requirement 
The “unique contribution to diversity” test also provides a reasonable path to apply 
Grutter’s sunset provision and eventually phase out race conscious admissions policies.  The 
Fisher litigation and ruling seemed to presume that once a particular “critical mass” is attained, a 
university would immediately have to stop using race conscious admissions policies.  Grutter 
stated that institutions should periodically review whether race conscious admissions policies are 
necessary, with the goal of phasing them out in favor of race neutral alternatives to attain 
diversity.
 308
  However, this cannot occur all at once when a particular “critical mass” is attained; 
in fact, this Article has argued that neither courts nor universities can precisely define “critical 
mass” or determine when a “critical mass” is present.309  Rather, the implementation of race 
neutral alternatives should be an incremental process.  Grutter’s “sunset” requirement is best 
interpreted to require a gradual reduction of race conscious policies in favor of race neutral 
admission policies “as they develop.” 310  The “unique contribution to diversity” test provides a 
means for universities to gradually phase out use of race in admissions, and for courts to review 
this process as necessary.  Eventually, this process would lead to the elimination of race 
conscious policies altogether, as espoused by Grutter, and the test articulated here provides a 
means for universities and for courts to assess, at any given time, to what extent their race 
conscious policies are necessary to attain the educational benefits of diversity. 
 
 
                                                          
308
 Grutter at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. … [i]n the context of higher 
education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and 
periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”). 
309
 See supra Part I.C.3. 
310
 Grutter at 342. (“Universities … can and should draw on the most promising aspects of  … race-neutral 
alternatives as they develop.”).  This also reinforces the point in Part V.C.2 that race conscious policies with a small 
impact can still be constitutional: one would expect a gradual reduction in the use of these policies if indeed 
universities are seeking to apply race-neutral alternatives. 
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 4.  Continued Constitutional Viability of Race Conscious Admissions Policies  
Although the “unique contribution to diversity” test holds universities to a more stringent 
standard to justify their use of race than the Fifth Circuit’s “good faith” standard, it will allow 
race conscious admissions policies to be constitutionally viable for longer.  The Supreme Court 
is likely to narrow Grutter’s doctrine on race conscious admissions,311 and the “unique 
contribution to diversity” test allows for this without compromising the enrollment of minority 
students.  This is the probably the best that proponents of affirmative action can hope for on the 
current Supreme Court.
312
 
5.  Highlighting Justice Kennedy’s Values Conflict: Predicating Diversity on     
     Segregation 
 
Finally, the “unique contribution to diversity” test can address an ironic twist in Fisher—
one that speaks to a values conflict in Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, and in American society 
more generally.  In Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized the educational benefits of diversity 
as a compelling interest, and even in dissent, Justice Kennedy recognized this interest
313
 and 
reiterated it in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.
314
  
Additionally, in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence noted that “[a] compelling 
interest exists in avoiding racial isolation,”315—a notion that would presumably be joined by four 
other Justices.
316
  If in Fisher, the Court precludes UT from using race conscious admissions, it 
would essentially be saying that the Top Ten Percent Law—a policy that increases minority 
                                                          
311
 See supra note 7. 
312
 Professor Derrick Bell used to warn students in his Constitutional Law course not to “let the perfect be the enemy 
of the good.”  For advocates of affirmative action, the proposal in this Article is certainly not perfect, but compared 
to overturning Grutter altogether, it is good. 
313
 See Grutter at 387-88(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“Our precedents provide a basis for the Court's acceptance of a 
university's considered judgment that racial diversity among  students can further its educational task …”).   
314
 551 U.S. 701, 791 (2007)(Kennedy, J., concurring)(“As the Court notes, we recognized the compelling nature of 
the interest in … diversity in higher education in  Grutter.).   
315
 Parents Involved at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
316
 Justice Kagan recused herself in Fisher, but she along with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor would 
likely agree with Justice Kennedy here.  See supra note 3. 
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representation only because of racial isolation in Texas public high schools
317—prevents UT 
from using race to pursue the educational benefits of diversity.   
This would be an ironic and unfortunate result.  The “unique contribution to diversity” 
test allows Justice Kennedy to impose strict scrutiny—thus satisfying his misgivings in 
Grutter
318—while still preserving UT’s ability to use narrowly tailored race conscious 
admissions policies. 
 
Conclusion 
 This Article has analyzed and elaborated upon the role of diversity within racial groups in 
determining the constitutionality of race conscious admissions policies.  It has done so in the 
context of Grutter and Fisher, with an eye towards Justice Kennedy’s impending vote in the 
latter.  The theory of “critical mass” presented here reflects the compelling interest of breaking 
down racial stereotypes that is articulated in Grutter, and that logically coheres with Grutter’s 
narrow tailoring principles and the need for deference to universities.  By analyzing these issues, 
this Article explicates the principle that race conscious admissions policies can aim not only to 
increase representation of particular groups of minority students, but also to attain diversity with 
racial groups.   
Further, in its analysis of Fisher, this Article addresses the scope of deference given to 
universities with respect to race conscious admissions policies.  It distinguishes deference on 
three issues: implementation, educational objective, and need and delineates how standards of 
review are different for each.  The Article builds upon its earlier analysis of “critical mass” to 
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 Grutter at 395(Kennedy, J., dissenting)(“ If the Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the 
use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority to approve the use of race in pursuit of student 
diversity.”). 
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propose a tangible test for courts to evaluate the constitutionality of race conscious admissions 
policies when race neutral alternatives are in place, or when a Plaintiff convincingly 
demonstrates that they may work as well as race conscious policies.  The “unique contribution to 
diversity” test proposed here focuses not on whether a “critical mass” is present on campus or in 
particular classrooms; rather, it centers more immediately on whether the race conscious policy 
in question makes a tangible, meaningful contribution to the diversity of perspectives and 
experiences on campus, beyond the race neutral policies that are in place.  This test addresses the 
issues raised by Justice Kennedy in his Grutter dissent and the critiques of Fisher posed by Chief 
Judge Jones in her dissent to the en banc denial.
319
  The “unique contribution to diversity” test 
also provides an interpretation of Grutter that allows strict scrutiny rather than “good faith” to 
apply in a case like Fisher. 
 Finally, this Article highlights the values conflict in Fisher—the problem of predicating 
campus diversity on school segregation through the Top Ten Percent Law.  This conflict will be 
one that Justice Kennedy will grapple with when determining his vote in Fisher.  It is also one 
aspect of a larger contradiction in America: the desire for an anti-essentialist, colorblind society 
without the will to tangibly address the rampant racial inequalities that exist in this country.  
Affirmative action in higher education is just one small manifestation of this dilemma, which is 
certain to appear again and again in American law and politics.  It would be an ironic and 
unfortunate twist if the Court were to rule in a manner that predicates diversity in higher 
education on racial segregation in K-12 schooling, which has actually been increasing for the 
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past 25 years.
320
  But more immediately, it is important to highlight this conflict in Justice 
Kennedy’s own jurisprudence,321 as he will likely cast the deciding vote in Fisher v. Texas. 
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